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DIFFERENTIATING THE CORPORATION:
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
David Hughes*

I. Introduction
Imagine the following scenario: A mid-sized South American state retains the services of a private military contractor (“PMC”) to aid in its decade-long fight against a transnational narco-trafficking organization. A routine reconnaissance mission is disrupted by members of a small Hoxhaistliberation group. Mistaking the PMC for the local military, the rebels fire a
rocket-propelled grenade towards the convoy. Responding, the contractors
pursue. Drawn away from their intended route, the PMC comes under further attack. They radio for assistance. Members of the PMC, 35-miles away,
board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that was recently procured from a
private aviation leasing company headquartered in Glendale, Arizona. Support arrives, but the rebels have dispersed throughout a rural village. The
helicopter circles. Someone in the village, obscured in the shadows between
two buildings, fires upwards. A member of the PMC locates the individual
and from a side-mounted machine gun returns a volley of bullets. The target
is killed alongside three civilians who had sought refuge within a nearby
building.
Two weeks later and 300 miles away, representatives of an Antwerp
based agricultural conglomerate arrive in the Capital to facilitate the expansion of a palm oil plantation. Government officials from the Office of Business Development believe that the now heavily regulated Asian market,
where much of the world’s palm oil production originates, no longer meets
international demand. A ten-year plan, approved by Parliament, expands the
industry and positions the state to become the largest global exporter of
palm oil in the region. The Belgian corporation holds a thirty-five percent
stake in the operations and will support efforts to expand production facilities. The desired growth, however, requires expansive deforestation in a region of the country that is the site of a low-intensity armed conflict between

*
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the military and a large indigenous population that have long sought autonomous self-rule. Resistance by a coalition of environmentalists, human
rights groups, and armed fighters from the indigenous community is anticipated. The Belgian delegation and representatives from the Office of Business Development reach an informal agreement. The Government will ensure that the agribusiness receives unimpeded access to the required land
and will guarantee that any militant activities are instantly suppressed.
In 1970, Milton Friedman pronounced that the sole social responsibility
1
of business is to increase profit. In the above hypothetical, several entities
act dutifully. The PMC that assumes a kinetic role, the company that repurposes and leases decommissioned military vehicles, and the transnational
corporation that seeks to expand within a profitable market all prioritize
earnings. Each demonstrates little regard towards, or awareness of, the host
state’s constituents’ interests. International law balances the desire to provide investor protection with efforts to safeguard against corporate complic2
ity in egregious human rights violations and international crimes. But do
the above activities raise particular concerns that are derived from international humanitarian law (“IHL”)?
IHL—the body of international law that endeavors to limit the effects of
warfare, protect individuals not participating in hostilities, and designate
3
how force is used—applies in all instances of armed conflict. Accountability for violations of IHL is traditionally attributed to states and to individu4
als. The contributions of corporate actors also come within the auspices of
IHL. Despite the proliferation of legal initiatives and literature addressing
the human rights obligations of businesses, IHL’s applicability to corporate

1.
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profit,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/afriedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
2.
See generally Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights, 20 BERK. J. INT’L L. 45 (2002). See also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
3.
See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (3d ed., 2010); see also MARCO SASSÒLI,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, CONTROVERSIES, AND SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE (2019); EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2015).
4.
2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL 2: PRACTICE 3507–12,
3606–10 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (detailing rules 149
and 151 within the ICRC’s customary International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) study which
assess responsibility for violation of IHL by states and individuals respectively); see also
DALE STEPHENS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE QUESTION
OF THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN AMELIORATING VIOLENCE IN
ARMED CONFLICT, IN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TIM MCCORMACK 177, 179, 188 fn. 52, 197
(Jadranka Petrovic ed., 2017); Gentian Zyberi, Enforcement of International Humanitarian
Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, TRIBUNALS, AND COURTS 390–91,
395 (Gerd Oberleitner, ed., 2018).

Fall 2020]

Differentiating the Corporation

49
5

entities that operate within conflict zones has received minimal attention.
The emphasis on human rights considerations is essential. However, it is
neither proportionate to the frequency with which corporations operate
within conflict zones nor does it reflect, perhaps, the “more certain foundation” upon which norms derived from IHL directly bind the operations of
6
corporations or their officials.
But how are these operations assessed and regulated? In the described
scenario surely the culpability of the PMC differs from that of the aviation
leasing firm which, in turn, differs from the agribusiness. How does international law treat these disparate forms of corporate conduct when the implicated behavior occurs within a conflict zone? And how do the occurrent accountability challenges differ from those similar limitations commonly
associated with state responsibility?
This article considers the particularities that affect how accountability is
imposed for corporate behavior that implicates IHL. I ask: Do existing accountability frameworks—the amalgamation of the primary rules that international law imposes upon corporate actors and the secondary rules that determine and implement the consequences of a primary breach—adequately
regulate corporations whose behavior implicates international humanitarian
law? I suggest that despite the prevalence of familiar impediments and enforcement challenges, accountability is further compromised by two features distinctive to corporations. The applicable legal framework inadequately conceptualizes both the form of corporations and the operational
nature of corporate activity. These features differentiate the corporation
from the state. Collectively, they present particular regulatory questions;
questions that remain under-conceptualized by the patchwork of legal regimes initially designed to ensure accountability for the conduct of states
and their representatives and that are now applied to a variety of non-state
actors.
The significance of these questions is clear. Corporations wield enormous power. Accelerated by the era of globalization, their supply chains
stretch across the world and they exert vast influence over both domestic
7
and international politics. A recent list of the one hundred largest revenuegenerating entities contains twenty-nine states and seventy-one corpora8
tions. Notwithstanding the ability of these organizations to generate wealth,

5.
Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 324–25 (2011) (suggesting that the current
emphasis results from the prominence and dynamism of human rights and the relative conservatism of IHL as a discipline).
6.
Id.
7.
See Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational
Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 307, 307-308 (2004).
8.
Milan Babic, Eelke Heemskerk & Jan Fichtner, Who is More Powerful – States or
Corporations?, CONVERSATION (July 10, 2018), https://theconversation.com/who-is-morepowerful-states-or-corporations-99616.
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drive employment, innovation, and economic growth, corporations also possess the capacity to cause significant harm.
9
This is particularly acute during instances of armed conflict. Following
the Second World War, the United States asserted that the culpability of
10
German industrialists equaled that of the state. As William Schabas reminds, many IHL violations would not occur but for the contributions of
11
arms dealers, diamond traders, bankers, and financiers. By fueling the war
effort in Western Europe, with the extraction of wealth from the world’s
most vulnerable landscapes, and through the supply of personnel and weaponry to employ force under the cloak of privatization, business entities are
immersed in the conduct and continuance of conflict. But how does the nature of the corporation pose specific challenges to a regulatory framework
that developed in reaction to state conduct? How is corporate activity evolving to affect IHL in previously unforeseen ways? And how do we most efficaciously conceptualize a relationship between the corporation and IHL that
both reaffirms old questions and presents new regulatory challenges?
This article has three purposes. First, within section II, I describe the
doctrinal methods through which accountability for corporate conduct implicating IHL may be pursued. The section tells of the emergence of a
piecemeal framework. Under this framework accountability for corporate
conduct is achieved indirectly, through secondary rules imposed by separate
12
doctrinal forms. International criminal law (“ICL”), international human
rights law (“IHRL”), and domestic legislation and courts each provide a potential means of securing accountability for violations of IHL. These bodies
of law all extend to the actions of corporations. But these legal fields—
collectively, the attempt to regulate corporate conduct—are hampered in
specific ways when they extend beyond the state and to the corporation.
Corporations have gained international legal status through a succession of
developments. Advancements in corporate responsibility, however, have resulted in a mismatch between the primary rules that purport to govern business conduct, the secondary rules through which regulatory efforts are implemented, and the nature of and the manner in which corporate entities
operate within conflict zones.
9.
U.N. Human Rights Council [“HRC”], Business and Human Rights in ConflictAffected Regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Responses ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC
/17/32 (May 27, 2011) (featuring John Ruggie stating that the most egregious rights violations
occur in conflict environments where legal regimes cannot be expected to function as intended).
10.
See Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of the Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C. 1
(Nov. 12, 1945).
11.
William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices, 83 INT. REV. RED CROSS 439, 441 (2001).
12.
See Ratner, supra note 2, at 481 (clarifying the distinction between the existence of
a responsibility imposed by international law and the various means through which this responsibility may be implemented).

Fall 2020]

Differentiating the Corporation

51

This results in accountability gaps. This article’s second purpose is to
identify features that contribute to these gaps. Section III describes how despite the capacity of the relevant doctrinal forms to impose accountability in
particular scenarios, the development of the primary and secondary rules
regulating corporate conduct exhibit structural limitations. Limitations in
the legal frameworks governing the conduct of hostilities are familiar. The
extent to which these have allowed states to operate with impunity is well13
documented and the subject of ongoing reform. The gradual development
of a regulatory framework, intended to treat corporate activity occurring
within conflict zones and affecting IHL, however, exhibits particular vulnerabilities that are the subject of this article. This section describes: (i)
structural challenges that complicate the transference of state-based frameworks to corporations and (ii) how the resulting accountability processes
have failed to adequately consider, and are thus adversely affected by, particular features of the corporate form.
This article’s final purpose is to offer a more complete understanding of
divergent business operations that often occur beyond the conceptual
boundaries of the relevant legal frameworks. Accordingly, section IV considers the nature of corporate operations. Through a series of case studies, I
consider how varied forms of corporate behavior elude treatment and affect
IHL. Often, the implicated conduct is uncontemplated by existing legal
frameworks. New technologies and corporate innovation present novel challenges. Efforts to ensure accountability for corporate behavior must begin
by more fully conceptualizing the ways that corporate conduct can affect
IHL-based norms. This section presents three broad categorizations of corporate activity that implicate IHL: as a direct violator, as a facilitator, or as
an incidental contributor.
Corporate activities, occurring within a conflict zone and implicating
IHL, exhibit a range of moral and legal culpabilities. The ability of the existing frameworks to treat these forms of corporate conduct decreases as the
proximity between the corporation and the violation widens. However, the
distance between conduct and consequence does not lessen the extent that
norms derived from IHL are affected by these varied, emerging, forms of
corporate behavior. Collectively, as corporations continue to gain legal status, the prospect of ensuring accountability dwindles when the applied
frameworks fail to fully envision both the nature of a corporation and the
extent of its activities. Part five concludes.
To narrow the existing accountability gaps, we must begin by aligning
conceptualizations of corporate conduct and a more accurate conception of
the corporate form with an encompassing notion of accountability that exceeds the confines of the existing doctrinal prescriptions. Whether limited

13.
See EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, PROMOTING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2–5 (Oct. 2016), https:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites
/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-10-05-promoting-compliance-ihl-gill ard.pdf.
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by a lack of identifiable law or an inability to enforce existing law, regulatory efforts must better reflect the contours of the debates they seek to affect.
Rarely does the corporation pull the trigger, dig the mass grave, or promote
the elimination of a group. History shows they are more likely to finance the
purchase of the gun, manufacture the shovel, or idle while the propaganda
resonates. Yet paradigms are shifting. Corporations are engaging in new activities, affecting international humanitarian law in unforeseen ways. While
international law has moved from its state-centric origins, assessments of
corporate conduct remain bound by the confines of the various doctrinal
forms, those primary and secondary rules, through which accountability is
pursued.

II. Indirect Accountability for Corporate Violations of IHL
International law imposes rights and duties upon corporations. Notwithstanding the intricacies of debates regarding legal subjecthood or personality, various fields of international law increasingly and incrementally extend
14
to corporations. IHL binds all actors whose activities are closely linked to
15
armed conflict. States and organized armed groups do bear the greatest responsibility for implementing IHL, but a business entity whose activities are
closely linked to an armed conflict is required to respect relevant legal pre16
cepts. Commentators diverge on whether these obligations extend to legal
or natural persons. Assuming a more conservative stance, Emanuela-Chiara
17
Gillard suggests that businesses are not, per se, bound by IHL. Instead,
Gillard opines that while businesses are not formally bound, individual staff
are required to comply with IHL. This is because IHL applies to organized
armed groups and thus individuals. Gillard concludes that, by analogy, the
well-established principle of individual responsibility extends to both those
14.
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (1986) (directly recognizing that corporations are subjects of international law); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2001) (noting that the extension of personhood to corporations carries unintended risks); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 78–79 (2006) (arguing in favor of recognizing the limited legal personality of corporations).
15.
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [“ICRC”], BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 14 (2006), https://www.icrc.org
/en/publication/0882-business-and-international-humanitarian-law-introduction-rights-andobligations [hereinafter ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL].
16.
Id.
17.
See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, The Position with Regard to International Humanitarian Law, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 129, 130–31 (suggesting also that states may impose IHL-based obligations on businesses through domestic mechanisms meaning that while
businesses would not be bound at the international level, IHL can inform domestic obligations
that are extended to businesses).
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present within an armed conflict—members of armed groups; civilians; aid
workers; in-country business staff—and to those not physically present but
18
whose activities may violate IHL.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) presents a
more expansive position. IHL, they contend, grants protections to business
personnel (provided they do not partake in hostilities) and to the assets and
19
capital investments of the business enterprise. Equally, IHL imposes obligations on business staff and on the business itself that exposes both the
20
natural and legal person to the risk of criminal or civil liability.
Accountability for conduct implicating IHL is, however, realized indirectly. In response to violations by both states and corporations, accountability is implemented through a separate doctrinal form: international criminal law; international human rights law; and through domestic legislation
and courts. Here, I employ the notion of accountability broadly. It is used in
its fullest sense—as both imposing obligations that inform assessments of
21
culpability and prescribing consequences for breaches of those standards.
Consequences may be legal (e.g., judicial remedy) or non-legal (e.g., reputational costs; moral opprobrium). They may also be individual (criminal) or
22
collective (civil). This article, however, limits its scope to forms of legal
accountability. This should not be read as under-appreciating the potential
of non-legal redress. Such means of pursuing accountability are of particular
relevance to corporations but will only be touched on throughout the article.
The decision to narrow considerations is instead intended to maintain focus
on the development and limited scope of the formal legal frameworks.

18.
Id. at 131.
19.
See ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL, supra note 15, at 7; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that
“civilians shall enjoy protection against the dangers arising from military operations unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Protections alter should the corporation become a direct participant or unlawful combatant) (hereinafter First Additional Protocol).
20.
ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL, supra note 15, at 7.
21.
See Jutta Brunnée, International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law
of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 6 (2005) (describing international legal
accountability as “the legal justification of an international actor’s performance vis-à-viothers,
the assessment or judgment of that performance against international legal standards, and the
possible imposition of consequences if the actor fails to live up to applicable legal standards”)
(emphasis omitted); see also André Nollkaemper, Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Law: Three Perspectives, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE
LAW 179, 182 (Gerd Winter, ed., 2010) (discussing the use of “responsibility” to describe obligations).
22.
See STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY 3 (3d ed., 2009).
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Under these frameworks, whether accountability is assessed against legal or natural persons varies amongst and remains a contested legal ques23
tion. An encompassing notion of accountability that extends beyond the
individual to the business entity is desirable and likely constitutes a general
24
principle of law. Yet, the contours of this debate do not affect present considerations and thus need not be settled here. Instead, the following sections
consider how these frameworks have evolved to regulate corporate conduct.

A. International Criminal Law
Lord Holt, in an unnamed decision from 1701, declared that “a corpora25
tion is not indictable, but the particular members of it are.” The maxim societas delinquere non potest portends the once commonplace view that cor26
porations lack the requisite mens rea to commit a crime. This informed the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the emerging tenet of individual responsibility. In
the Goering case, the Tribunal claimed that “crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
27
be enforced.” The Nuremberg Charter extended the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
to the representatives of groups and organizations implicated in the war ef28
fort. In the I.G. Farben case, the U.S. Military Tribunal held that “it can no
longer be questioned that the criminal sanctions of international law are ap29
plicable to private individuals.” In three formative cases, leading German
industrialists were prosecuted for the commission of crimes against peace,
30
war crimes, and for crimes against humanity.
The extension of international criminal liability to corporations edged
forward. Diplomatic discussions, during the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (“ICTY
/ICTR”) and at the Rome Conference, produced a familiar admixture. States

23.
See DESISLAVA EMANOUUILOVA STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 95 (2010).
24.
See Ratner, supra note 2, at 461 (providing a strong normative account of why corporate liability should extend beyond individual responsibility).
25.
Anonymous Case No. 935 (1701), 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (KB).
26.
See Thomas J. Bernard, The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 8 (1984); see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 211 (5th ed. 2017).
27.
France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 I.M.T. 203, 447 (1946) (hereinafter Goering
Case).
28.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter, art. 9, opened for signature Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
IMT Statute].
29.
United States v. Carl Krauch et al., (I.G. Farben Case), 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136
(1948).
30.
Id.; See also United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 T.W.C. 1202 (1997); United
States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C. 1, 1–2 (1997).
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resisted formalizing corporate criminal responsibility but signaled a desire
31
to apply ICL to particular actions by legal persons. When the French delegation proposed that the Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
include a modest provision assessing corporate liability, the initiative garnered notable support. Ultimately, a congruence of practical limitations and
domestic differences precluded delegates from agreeing to an appropriate
32
formulation.
The post-war ICL tribunals have all held corporate officials liable for
33
atrocity crimes. The trials of the German industrialists signified the inter34
national community’s intent to look beyond the state structure. Article
25(1) of the Rome Statute is read to extend the Court’s jurisdiction to non35
state actors but only imposes responsibility on natural persons. The Office
of the Prosecutor has repeatedly indicated willingness to investigate corpo36
rate officials. And the ICTR, in the Media Case, convicted three employ37
ees of Radio Télévision des Mille Collines of genocide.

31.
See U.N. Secretary-General., Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (in
which delegates briefly considered extending International Criminal Law (“ICL”) to the conduct of criminal persons during discussions to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY”). Although the Secretary General stated that this was desirable, the initiative was rejected in favor of concentrating the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the actions of natural persons). See also Alex Batesmith, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for War
Crimes and other Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Impact of the Business
and Human Rights Movement, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 285, 290 (Caroline Harvey, James Summers
& Nigel D. White eds., 2014).
32.
See JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 165
(2003); JERNEJ LETNAR ERNI , HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (2010) (noting that the French
proposal would have limited liability to private corporations in which corporate liability could
be linked to the individual criminal responsibility of one of the corporation’s leading members).
33.
Julia Graff, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood
and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 23, 23 (2004).
34.
See United States v. Carl Krauch et al., (I.G. Farben Case), 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136
(1948); see also Krupp, 9 T.W.C. 1; United Kingdom v. Tesch (The Zyklon B Case), Case
No. 9, 1 L.R.T.W.C. 93 (1946).
35.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under
International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 351, 374–75 (2016).
36.
See Batesmith, supra note 31, at 292 (citing the Prosecutor’s general intent to look
at the involvement of corporate officials); see also Press Release, International Criminal
Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N.
Press Release L/3067 (Apr. 19, 2004) (indicating willingness to investigate the role of private
actors in the extractive industry that were accused of facilitating conflict in the Ituri Province
of the Democratic Republic of Congo); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 22
(Jan. 23, 2012) (in which Joshua Sang, a broadcaster at a radio station, was indicted as an in-
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David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
who led the American delegation at the Rome Conference, has detailed “an
increasing acceptance of corporate criminal liability in the almost two dec38
ades since the Rome Treaty was completed.” The Malabo Protocol will, if
adopted, extend the jurisdiction of the proposed African Criminal Court to
39
legal persons that are accused of committing an array of war crimes. The
Appeals Panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) held that the
Court may proceed against a media company that had been accused of con40
tempt. In a comprehensive judgement, the STL interrogated the historical
record. It held that the Goering pronouncement—that crimes were commit41
ted by natural persons—was merely obiter. U.N. resolutions were consult42
ed. Domestic legislation from forty-four countries was surveyed. Read collectively, the Appeals Panel contended that corporate criminal liability was
“on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle
43
of law applicable under international law.”
This status is further evidenced in several international treaties. The
Apartheid Convention extends criminal liability to both institutions and in44
dividuals. The illegal movement of hazardous waste is labelled an offence
when committed by either legal or natural persons under the Basel Conven45
tion. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(“OECD”) Anti-Bribery Convention obliges states to impose criminal liabil-

direct co-perpetrator of crimes against humanity for his role on the post-election violence in
Kenya).
37.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 1096,
1113–14 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also Kaeb, supra note 35 at 375–76.
38.
Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of
Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 6, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499) [hereinafter Scheffer Brief].
39.
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights art. 46I, adopted June 27, 2014, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties
/36398-treaty-0045__protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_
the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf.
40.
See Prosecutor v. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (Oct. 2,
2014).
41.
Id. ¶ 64.
42.
Manuel J. Ventura, The Prosecution of Corporations Before a Hybrid International
Criminal Tribunal: The New TV and Akhbar Beirut Contempt Jurisdiction Decisions of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 1 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 75–76 (2016).
43.
New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1 ¶ 67.
44.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid art. 1(2), adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18,
1976).
45.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal art. 2(14), opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 51.
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46

ity on legal persons that attempt to induce public officials. In the Convention on Action Against Trafficking, the Council of Europe requires parties
to ensure that corporations are made criminally liable for violations of the
47
treaty’s provisions. And the U.N.’s Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime defines a series of international offences that are applied to
48
both natural and legal persons.
The criminalization of particular forms of corporate behavior—
trafficking, environmental derogation, and corruption—offer a foundation
from which liability for IHL violations logically extends. Accordingly, Andrew Clapham suggests that there are “no theoretical barriers to subjecting
corporate war crimes to the developed international criminal legal order designed to tackle violations of international humanitarian law and interna49
tional human rights law.” Existing legal mechanisms have begun to do this
work. The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on
Crimes Against Humanity require that “each state shall take measures,
50
where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons. . .” Remedies
for corporate involvement in the most egregious breaches of IHL are provided in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
51
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. Accountability is provided through reparations where a person, legal person, or other
52
entity is found liable for a gross violation of IHL.

B. International Human Rights Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), in its preamble, extends the common standards contained within its text to “individuals

46.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [“OECD”] Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art.
2, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1997, 2802 U.N.T.S. 225.
47.
Council of Europe, Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings
art. 22, opened for signature Feb. 1, 2008, C.E.T.S. No. 197, 2569 U.N.T.S. 33.
48.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime arts. 5–6,
opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
49.
Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law
Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 178
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
50.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Crimes Against Humanity: Texts and Titles of the Draft Preamble, the Draft Articles and the Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.892, art. 6 ¶ 7 (May 26, 2017).
51.
See G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶ 3(c) (Mar. 21, 2006).
52.
Id. ¶ 15.
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53

and every organ of society.” This prompted Louis Henkin’s oft-cited contention that this encompassing formulation “excluded no one, no company,
54
no market, no cyberspace.” Yet, at least formally, the major human rights
instruments that built upon the UDHR did not recognize legal persons as ei55
ther the bearers or subjects of rights.
Evolution was gradual. Well-publicized events in the 1970s—the involvement of foreign corporations in Central and South American coups;
corporate officials that bribed states to receive lucrative military contracts—
encouraged efforts to regulate corporate conduct through international legal
56
mechanisms. The United Nations, following the establishment of the Centre for Transnational Corporations, and the OECD both produced non57
binding, draft codes of corporate behavior. Initially, however, human
rights considerations were indirect. The OECD guidelines, for example, desired creation of a “level playing field” for companies operating in territories where opportunities to accrue advantage through unregulated business
58
practices are widespread. This prompted criticisms that the OECD had
59
privileged investor rights above public interests. Early U.N. initiatives,
built around an ambitious redistributive agenda that began in the Global

53.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl. ¶ 10 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
54.
Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 25 (1999); see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 77.
55.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see also Silvia Steininger
& Jochen von Bernstorff, Who Turned Multinational Corprations into Bearers of Human
Rights? On the Creation of Corporate “Human” Rights in International Law, 25 MPIL
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 5–6 (2018).
56.
See Ratner, supra note 2, at 457 (noting that early impetus was derived from the
role that United Fruit Company and International Telephone and Telegraph played in efforts
to destabilize governments in Guatemala and Chile); see CLAPHAM, supra note 14, at 201 (also citing events in Chile as well as Lockheed’s payment of bribes to Japanese officials as motivating the OECD’s efforts to address corporate conduct); James Salzman, Labour Rights,
Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 769, 788 (2000).
57.
See Econ. and Soc. Council, Rep. on the Special Session of the Comm. on
Trans’at’l Corps. Supp. No. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1, annex II (1983); OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD/LEGAL/0144, annex 1
(1976), reprinted in THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
57 (1994); see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 457.
58.
See CLAPHAM, supra note 14, at 204; see also OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 31 (2011) (The Revised Guidelines (2001) would, however,
include direct reference to human rights considerations).
59.
John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges 2 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 15-045, 2015).
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South, failed to garner consensus and became mired in Cold War bipolari60
ty.
In 1977, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) adopted the
61
Tripartite Declaration of Principles. Unlike other soft law initiatives that
preceded it, the ILO Declaration was perceived as reflecting an appropriate
62
balance between governmental, industry, and workers’ interests. It explicitly held that all parties “should respect the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the Gen63
eral Assembly of the United Nations.” Through its subsequent amendments, the ILO Declaration promoted labor rights, as articulated in various
64
human rights instruments, and extended (soft) legal duties to corporations.
An array of voluntary declarations followed. As private initiatives,
through international organizations, and at the behest of various states, these
65
instruments offered broad affirmations of human rights principles. Momentum built. At the World Economic Forum in 1999, Kofi Annan an66
nounced the U.N. Global Compact. This non-binding initiative compels
businesses to support and respect the protection of internationally pro67
claimed human rights and avoid complicity in human rights abuses.

60.
See Economic and Social Council Res. 1913 (LVII) (Dec. 5 1974); see also Seymore J. Rubin, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Economic Relations: Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 73; John Gerrard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007); Branislav Gosovic & John Gerard
Ruggie, On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 30 INT’L ORG. 309 (1976).
61.
Declaration Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at
Its 204th Session (Nov. 1977), reprinted in Official Bulletin, at 49–56, Vol. LXI, Series A
(1978) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
62.
See Ratner, supra note 2, at 486.
63.
ILO Declaration, supra note 61, ¶ 8.
64.
Ratner, supra note 2, at 487.
65.
Alongside the state-initiated codes drafted by the U.N., OECD, and International
Labor Organization (“ILO”), a series of other initiatives were formalized between the 1970s
and 1990s. See e.g., Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 24
INT’L L. MAT. 1496, 1496–99 (1985); The MacBride Principles, by Father Sean McManus,
President, Irish National Causus, December 1997, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR.,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/links/macbride.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020); Resolution on EU
Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European
Code of Conduct, 1998 O.J. (C 104) 180; Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Volunta’y “Model
Business Princip’es” Issued by the Clinton Administration (May 26, 1995), Daily Rep. For
Executives. For a detailed account of such initiatives, see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting
International Respect for Worker Rights through Business Code of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 1 (1993); see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 79–80.
66.
U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan’s Address to World Economic Forum in Davos (Feb. 1, 1999), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content /sg/speeches/1999-02-01/kofi-annansaddress-world-economic-forum-davos.
67.
U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, princs. 1–
2, https://www.unglobal compact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
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Concurrently, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights began drafting the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Oth68
er Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. Proponents of the
69
Norms viewed self-regulation as ineffectual and, potentially, as harmful.
70
The draft Norms read like a treaty. They contained twenty-three articles
detailing an array of human rights obligations—civil and political, social
and economic, consumer protection, and environmental—pertinent to busi71
ness entities. The Norms, more comprehensive than preceding initiatives,
were positioned as a binding legal document. Ultimately, the Norms failed
to garner sufficient state and corporate support and were not adopted by the
72
Human Rights Commission.
Their influence is, nevertheless, enduring. Unlike many of the preceding rights-based initiatives, the Norms explicitly consider business entities
that operate within conflict zones. The draft’s preamble acknowledges that
business enterprises are obligated to respect norms contained within a pleth73
ora of international agreements including the Geneva Conventions. Corpo74
rations may not engage in or benefit from atrocity crimes. IHL informs
numerous articles that address the security of persons, forced labor, work75
er’s rights, and child protection. These references address the contexts that
prompted many of the early legal initiatives that sought to regulate the human rights implications of business practice. Rarely, however, did these inclusions explicitly recognize the potential of legal persons to benefit from or
perpetuate conflict.
The international community continued to pursue accountability initiatives that would address the relationship between business entities and human rights. After the Secretary General appointed John Ruggie as Special
Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(“UNGP”) were formulated with a strong intergovernmental mandate. Prin-

68.
See Ioan Maxim (Rapporteur), Rep. of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Its Fiftieth Session, Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E
/CN.4/1999/4-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45 (Sept. 30, 1998).
69.
See id.; see also S. Prakash Sethi & Donald H. Schepers, United Nations Global
Compact: The Promise-Performance Gap, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 193, 206–07 (2014).
70.
Ruggie, supra note 60, at 820.
71.
See U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN
/.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms].
72.
See U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/Dec
/2004/116 (Apr. 22, 2004); see also Ruggie, supra note 60, at 821.
73.
See U.N. Norms, supra note 71, pmbl.
74.
Id. art. 3.
75.
Id. arts. 3, 5–7 (each article notes the relevancy of IHL in relation to specific provisions that address security and worker’s rights).
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ciple 7 recognizes that the risk of human rights abuses is heightened within
conflict-affected areas and calls upon states to ensure that businesses do not
76
contribute to such abuses. The commentary to Principle 12 holds that
business operations within an armed conflict “should respect the standards
77
of international humanitarian law.”
Questions remain regarding how, and the extent to which, IHRL78
derived duties can be transposed to further ensure corporate accountability.
Accountability initiatives, like the in-progress Legally Binding Instrument
to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, are increasingly mindful of the challenges posed by armed conflict to the business and human
79
rights relationship. Civil society initiatives complement intergovernmental
80
efforts to redress harmful business activities. And the UNGP’s operationalization process has increased attention on the challenges of conducting
81
business in conflict-affected areas.

76.
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles].
77.
See Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (OHCHR), Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, at 13–14 (2011),
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
78.
See Ratner, supra note 2, at 492–97.
79.
See e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises (July 16, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ HRCouncil
/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf (in which the revised draft treaty builds upon the appeals to IHL contained within the UNGP).
80.
See e.g., OECD, OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in
Weak Governance Zones (2006), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility
/36885821.pdf; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, https://www.voluntary
principles.org/the-principles/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); The Kimberley Process, https://
www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
GUIDANCE ON RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS
(2010), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_ Business/Guidance_
RB.pdf; YADAIRA ORSINI & ROPER CLELAND, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE IN
CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS (2018), https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files
/Economy_Human%20RightsDueDiligenceGuidance_ EN_2018.pdf; SHIFT, HUMAN RIGHTS
DUE DILIGENCE IN HIGH RISK CIRCUMSTANCES (2015), https://shiftproject.org/resource/ human-rights-due-diligence-in-high-risk-circumstances.
81.
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and
Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, U.N. Doc. A/HR/17/32 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Special Representative Report 2011].
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C. Domestic Legislation and Courts
Accountability for violations of IHL relies upon domestic enforcement
82
mechanisms. The Geneva Conventions require states parties to incorporate
83
IHL standards into domestic law. This inclusion envisioned that national
courts would assume a significant role in regulating the conduct of actors
84
engaged in armed conflict. Many states initially lacked the necessary legis85
lative foundation to address IHL violations. However, following adoption
of the Rome Statute, states amended their criminal codes to include interna86
tional crimes within domestic legislation. Comprehensive legislative and
jurisprudential frameworks emerged to offer and inform accountability op87
tions across numerous jurisdictions. These developments prompted Marco
Sassòli’s observation that IHL had assumed new credibility and offered im88
proved effectiveness.

82.
Gentian Zyberi, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, TRIBUNALS AND COURTS 377, 381–84 (Gerd Oberleitner, ed, 2018);
see also Sharon Weill, Building Respect for IHL Through National Courts, 96 INT. REV. RED
CROSS 859, 861 (2014).
83.
See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art.49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention] (each containing common provisions that impose obligations to prosecute individuals that have committed war crimes).
84.
Weill, supra note 82, at 861.
85.
See Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders,
38 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 219 (2010).
86.
See Rome Statute, supra note 35, arts. 1, 17; see also Ramiro García Falconí, The
Codification of Crimes Against Humanity in the Domestic Legislation of Latin American
States, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 453 (2010). See generally F. INT’L CRIM. AND
HUMANITARIAN L., IMPORTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES INTO NATIONAL LAW
(Morten Bergsmo, Mads Harlem & Nobuo Hayshi eds., 2d ed. 2010).
87.
See Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, §§ 6, 11, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (finding
that the Sudanese Government would use the sale of oil to facilitate military action and directing the Secretary of State to collect information on violations of IHL); see also Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§ 2–3, 117 Stat. 864 (2003) (acknowledging violations of international law in Burma and forbidding all trade that would
support the military regime); Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. Rev. 167, 206–09 (2005).
88.
Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current
and Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 46 (2007).
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The use of domestic mechanisms to impose IHL accountability for cor89
porate action builds upon pre-existing regulatory frameworks. Accountability manifests through both criminal and civil pursuits, through both purely domestic mechanisms and with the use of universal jurisdiction. Criminal
accountability, implemented directly, is grounded in the identical requirement, posed in each of the four Geneva Conventions, that obliges parties to
enact legislation and provide penal sanctions for violations constituting
90
grave breaches. A 2006 survey of various domestic legal regimes concluded that incorporation initiatives often went beyond the limits of the international legal architecture. Commonly, when imposing criminal liability, these
91
jurisdictions did not distinguish between natural and legal persons.
A host of prosecutions followed. Many of these actions concern individual actors—both state officials and members of non-state armed
92
groups—that have been accused of IHL violations. Yet, several notable
instances demonstrate the willingness of domestic forums to impose accountability for business actions occurring within armed conflict. In a celebrated 2007 decision, the Dutch Court of Appeal in The Hague increased
93
the sentence of Frans van Anraat. Van Anraat was the principal supplier of
thiodiglycol to Iraq. After Saddam Hussein’s government used these supplies to manufacture mustard gas, deployed in attacks against Iran and the
Kurdish population in Halabja, van Anraat was convicted of complicity in

89.
See Albin Eser & Felix Rettenmaier, Criminality of Organizations: Lessons from
Domestic Law – A Comparative Perspective, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 222, 222–223 (André Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009).
90.
See First Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention,
supra note 83, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 129; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 83, art. 146.
91.
See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND
CONFLICT 15–16 (2006).
92.
See Emina Dizdarevi , Bosnia Indicts Serb for Crimes Against Humanity in Kljuc,
DETEKTOR (Oct. 11, 2018), http://detektor.ba/en/bosnia-indicts-serb-for-crimes-againsthumanity-in-kljuc/ (describing the 2018 indictment of Zoran Adamovic by the Bosnian State
Court); Benjamin Duerr, International Crimes: Spotlight on Germany’s War Crimes Unit,
PHILIPPE KIRSCH INSTITUTE (Jan. 10, 2019), http://www.kirschinstitute.ca/fr/internationalcrimes-spotlight-germanys-war-crimes-unit/ (summarizing German trials against numerous
individuals accused of various war crimes and IHL violations in Syria, Rwanda, and the
DRC); DRC: Two Militiamen Found Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, TRIAL INT’L (Sept.
25, 2018), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/drc-two-militiamen-found-guilty-of-crimesagainst-humanity/ (describing the first convictions by a military tribunal in the DRC against
two former militia commanders that had been accused of crimes against humanity).
93.
See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 mei 2007, NJ 2007, BA4676, m.nt. M.C.Z. (Public Prosecutor/ Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat) (Neth.) (for an English overview, see Public
Prosecutor v. Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat, INT’L CRIMES DATABASE,
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/ 168/Van-Anraat/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2020)).
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94

war crimes. In 2018, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the
conviction of Guus Kouwenhoven for aiding and abetting in the commission
95
of war crimes. Kouwenhoven, the head of Oriental Timber Corporation
and the Royal Timber Company, had trafficked arms to Liberian dictator
96
Charles Taylor in violation of Security Council sanctions.
A series of French cases further evidence the capacity of domestic legal
bodies to impose accountability for corporate violations of IHL. In 2011, a
Paris court began proceedings against Amesys, a French subsidiary of the
97
Bull Group. The technology company was accused of developing a surveillance network that the Gaddafi regime in Libya used to identify, detain,
98
and torture political dissidents. Qosmos, a French software company, is
under investigation for complicity in torture by the Al-Assad regime in Syr99
ia. And in 2018, the French multinational, Lafarge was indicted for com100
plicity in crimes against humanity. Significantly, the corporate entity itself
101
was indicted. This marked the first instance in which a legal person was
102
implicated in the commission of a war crime.
Despite the increasing willingness of domestic courts to pursue criminal
action against corporate actors, prosecutions remain rare. Leora Bilsky convincingly argues that fixating on criminal remedies obscures the often more
efficacious “specificities of civil litigation as a potential tool of corporate

94.
Id. (noting that Van Anraat was acquitted of the charge of genocide as the prosecution were unable to determine that he was aware of the Iraqi regime’s genocidal intent); see
Salil Tripathi, Business in Armed Conflict Zones: How to Avoid Complicity and Comply with
International Standards, 50 POLITIRBUS 131, 132–33 (2010).
95.
HR 18 december 2018, NJ 2018, 1394, m.nt. H.J.S.K. (The Public Prosecutor/
Guus Kouwenhoven) (Neth.) (for an English overview, see http://www.internationalcrimes
database.org/Case/3309/The-Public-Prosecutor-v-Guus-Kouwenhoven/).
96.
Id. See also, Batesmith, supra note 31, at 305.
97.
See generally INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS., THE AMESYS CASE (2015),
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/report_amesys_case_eng.pdf.
98.
Id.
99.
See Qosmos, TRIAL INT’L (Sept. 12, 2019), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post
/qosmos/ (noting that new information was presented to the Court after the examining Magistrate decided to close the case and that the investigation is ongoing).
100.
See France: Cement Company Lafarge Indicted by Investigative Judges over its
Syria Activities, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (June 28, 2018), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/france-cement-company-lafarge-indicted-by-investigative-judges-overits-syria-activities.
101.
Alexandru Tofan, The Lafarge Affair: A First Step Towards Corporate Criminal
Liability for Complicity in Crimes against Humanity, ASSER INST.: DOING BUS. RTS. BLOG
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.asser.nl/ DoingBusinessRight/Blog/post/the-lafarge-affair-a-firststep-towards-corporate-criminal-liability-for-complicity-in-crimes-against-humanity-byalexandru-tofan.
102.
See Liz Alderman, Terrorism Financing Charge Upheld Against French Company
Lafarge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/business/lafargeterrorism-syria.html.

Differentiating the Corporation

Fall 2020]

65

103

accountability.” Civil avenues have long been available. An influential
corporate complicity report by the International Commission of Jurists noted that “in every jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor can be held liable under the law of civil remedies if through
104
negligent or intentional conduct it causes harm to someone else.” The relevant civil provisions extend domestic jurisdiction to corporate actors im105
plicated in violations of international humanitarian or criminal law.
The body of litigation produced under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in
106
the United States merits particular attention. The ATS provides district
courts with jurisdiction for “any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty of the United
107
States.” Importantly, relevant ATS cases meld IHL norms and ICL stand108
ards with domestic torts. Cases have been brought against both individu109
als and corporate actors. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Court held that the
ATS’s jurisdiction extends to claims of war crimes and other violations of
110
international humanitarian law. The scope of the ATS has, however, nar111
rowed considerably.
Despite curtailment of the ATS in the United States, other jurisdictions
112
increasingly offer expanding avenues to pursue redress. The International
Commission of Jurists has noted that civil accountability can “significantly
influence patterns of behaviour in a society, raising expectations as to what
is acceptable conduct, and preventing repeat of particular conduct, by both
the actor held liable, and by other actors who operate in similar

103.
LEORA BILSKY, THE HOLOCAUST, CORPORATIONS, AND THE LAW 33 (2017).
104.
3 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008) [hereinafter ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT].
105.
See RAMASASTRY & THOMPSON, supra note 91, at 22–25.
106.
See generally BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL
HOFFMAN & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS (2nd ed. 2008).
107.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15,
729 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
108.
See Bismuth, supra note 85, at 225.
109.
See Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International
Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 49 (2013); Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
110.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–44 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bismuth, supra
note 85, at 222–24.
111.
See infra Section III.C.
112.
Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 259, 279–281 (2012) (detailing developments in the use of civil litigation within
the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Europe); see Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, [2020]
5 S.C.R. (Can) (indicating willingness to hear civil cases alleging that corporations had violated norms of customary international law in their overseas operations).
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113

spheres. . .” Accountability for corporate violations has undoubtedly advanced over the past decades. Yet practice demonstrates that limitations
shroud each of the ancillary methods used to extend accountability to corporations whose business activities occur within conflict zones. Both structural
and implementation challenges affect each of the discussed doctrinal approaches. Collectively, these contribute to accountability gaps. The following section discusses how structural factors complicate the transference of
these legal frameworks to corporations and how the resulting regulatory advancements are complicated by various features of the corporate form.

III. Identifying Accountability Gaps
Structural and operational factors inhibit the regulatory efforts that extend to corporate entities operating within conflict zones. The legal frameworks, described above, have developed through analogies. The corporation
114
is likened to, and regulated through, the state. The legal mechanisms, a
series of primary and secondary rules, concepts, and norms that are traditionally intended to limit and regulate the ways in which militaries use
force, are applied to business entities. However, the transference of existing
mechanisms, initially designed through a statist gaze, do not neatly map onto the corporate form. Failures to appreciate the specificities of the corporation result in regulatory frameworks that are structurally ill-equipped to address various manifestations of business operations that implicate IHL.
Aspects of these challenges are familiar. They consist of overarching
implementation and enforcement deficits with which the international lawyer is well-acquainted. Such features do not extend exclusively to IHL. IHL
does, however, experience particular challenges that differentiate it from
those other fields of international law that regulate corporate conduct. Two
factors motivate this article’s narrow scope. The first is urgency. The salience of the identified accountability gaps is increased in relation to IHL. As
corporations become prominent international actors imbued with state-like
characteristics—what Jay Butler has recently termed semi-states—the
state’s traditional monopolization of the use of force is likely to erode fur115
ther as the involvement of corporations in conflict increases.
The second challenge stems from IHL’s dependence upon domestic
mechanisms. The absence of a universal judicial system means that many
areas of international law are reliant upon domestic implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. Such reliance is heightened with IHL when enforcement lags and permanent international courts hear only a select few
113.
ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT, supra note 104, at 4.
114.
Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 961 (2008) (noting that both corporations and states unite individuals
for common purpose and both possess the capacity for good or ill).
115.
See generally Jay Butler, Corporations as Semi-States, 57 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNAT’L L. 221 (2019).
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116

cases. Efforts to ensure IHL accountability through domestic means are
pursued directly or indirectly through a civilian court or the military justice
system. In such instances a judicial body will decide whether an individual’s
actions violate IHL. They will consider whether a policy is compliant with
the state’s international obligations. And they will interpret the content and
117
specificity of these obligations. In each instance, the domestic interaction
presupposes some relation to the state. It fails to consider the specificities of
the corporation and how these will affect the pursuit of accountability.
Often these specificities reflect the nature of the corporation itself. Cor118
porations assume a diversity of structures. Despite variants, five features
are common amongst all corporations. The corporate form is constructed
around: (i) legal personality; (ii) limited liability; (iii) transferable shares;
(iv) centralized management and a board structure; and (v) shared owner119
ship. All jurisdictions contain legislation that provides for the formation
120
of organizations that exhibit these characteristics. Yet as many commentators note, the corporation is not merely a legal entity. It is a significant international actor that regularly influences economic, political, and social pro121
ceedings.
This public-private dichotomy undergirds both calls for
122
corporate regulation and the creation of regulatory challenges.
It is here, however, that a state-derived approach impresses upon efforts
123
to check corporate conduct. Because the corporate entity possesses analogous powers, subsequent efforts to impose accountability recall those similar techniques, doctrines, and instruments whose erstwhile application is
124
limited to, or derived from, the state. The corporation is, as Fleur Johns
describes, rendered state-like to neatly impose international law-based re125
straints. But when regulatory efforts result in the coupling of familiar
structural limitations and under-appreciated features of the corporate form,

116.
See Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Joint Blog Series: Application of International Humanitarian Law by Domestic Courts, EJIL TALK! (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/application-of-international-humanitarian-law-by-domestic-courts.
117.
Id; see also Zyberi, supra note 82, at 383.
118.
Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 729, 753 (2012).
119.
See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 5 (Reinier Kraakman, et al., 2017); see also ALICE
DE JONGE, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2013).
120.
See Armour, supra note 119, at 5.
121.
See Id. at 22–25; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 452–59.
122.
See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 39 DUKE L. J. 201, 201–02 (1990);
see also Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT. L.J. 229, 235.
123.
See Fleur Johns, Theorizing the Corporation in International Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 635, 641–42 (Anne Orford and Florian
Hoffmann eds., 2016).
124.
Id.
125.
Id. at 643.
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these processes contribute to the generation of accountability gaps that facilitate the corporation’s ability to operate beyond the reach of the imposed legal frameworks.

A. The Limited Scope of International Criminal Law
International criminal law can provide an effective means of imposing
accountability for the most egregious corporate violations of IHL. Yet despite notable successes, ICL’s scope remains limited. The U.S. Military Tri126
bunal at Nuremberg sought accountability for corporate violations. The
German industrialists were accused of dire acts. They had enabled the forcible transfer and enslavement of whole populations, aided in the procurement
of weapons brandished to wage aggressive war, and supplied the chemicals
127
and poisons deployed in the concentration camps. Prosecutions have,
since these formative trials, focused (though with important and foretelling
exceptions) on natural not legal persons. Accountability is, however, limited
by two factors. First, these post-Nuremberg developments limit judicial
reach to all but the most egregious violators. And second, efforts to impose
corporate accountability through the extension of a complicity standard that
draws upon international jurisprudence, domestic legal prescriptions, and a
series of mechanisms designed to address state conduct are restricted by
particular features of the corporate form.
Transfixed by the most serious core crimes, Article 5 of the Rome Statute focuses the Court’s jurisdiction on instances of genocide, crimes against
128
humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Similarly, the inclusion of grave
breaches within the Geneva Conventions directs attention towards those
violations that are of particular seriousness and which require the High Con129
tracting Parties to prosecute offending entities. Compelling policy reasons
130
support these narrow approaches. Several scholars, however, demonstrate
131
that the designation of core crimes is largely artificial. Various forms of

126.
See generally Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The
‘Other Schindlers’, 9 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L.J. 173 (1995).
127.
See United States v. Krauch, Judgment, 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136 (1948); See also
United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 T.W.C. 1202 (1997); United States v. Krupp (The
Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C 1 (1997).
128.
Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5 (noting that the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community”).
129.
See First Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 50; see also Second Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 147.
130.
See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/ 20160915_OTP-PolicyCase-SelectionEng.pdf.
131.
See Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 768 (Kevin Jon Heller, et al.
eds., forthcoming); see also Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 1400 (2009).
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corporate behavior that do not constitute core crimes or amount to grave
breaches but nevertheless implicate IHL remain under-conceptualized by
the existing ICL mechanisms.
Accountability gaps form in the space between the commission of a
core crime and the familiar conduct of a modern corporation. John Ruggie
tells that “few legitimate firms may ever directly commit acts that amount to
international crimes. . .[T]here is a greater risk of their facing allegations of
132
complicity in such crimes.” Criminal tribunals have prosecuted corporate
133
actors as accomplices in the commission of war crimes. ICL deems such
134
faciliatory acts as aiding and abetting. Yet it is but for the rare or egre135
gious instances that corporate complicity receives prosecutorial attention.
And international law has not yet provided a coherent doctrine of complicity
136
that can be seamlessly applied amongst its many sub-fields.
In Khulumani v. Barclays, Judge Katzmann described complicity as the
preferred doctrinal means of ensuring that “private actors who substantially
assist state actors [to] violate international law and do so for the purpose of
137
facilitating the unlawful activity [are] held accountable for their actions.”
The requisite complicity standard is adapted from legal sources that either
treat state conduct or inadequately acknowledge the particularities of corpo138
rate actors.
132.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4
/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter HRC, Standards of Responsibility].
133.
See, e.g., United Kingdom v. Tesch (The Zyklon B Case), Case No. 9, 1
L.R.T.W.C. 93 (1946); see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 442.
134.
See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 195 (May 21,
1999) (defining aiding as giving assistance to someone while abetting involves facilitating the
commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto). See also Schabas, supra note 11, at 442.
135.
See ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at
6–7 (2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6
/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (declaring that the OPT should focus resources on those
who bear the greatest responsibility). For exceptions see ICC Press Release, supra note 36
(regarding the examination of atrocity crimes in the DRC); see also Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
Prosecutor, ICC, Report at the Second Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003) (acknowledging the influence of mineral extraction on the conflict in the Ituri Province and expressing willingness to investigate private actors facilitating the conflict); Kaeb, supra note 35, at 375.
136.
See Butler, supra note 115, at 278–89.
137.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 281 (2d Cir. 2007).
138.
See John G. Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Promotion
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including The Right To Development: Clarifying the Concepts of Sphere of Influence and
Complicity, ¶¶ 33–48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter UNHRC, Clarifying the Concepts]; DE JONGE, supra note 119, at 152, 155 (extending the Draft Articles to
transnational corporations); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 16, in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (holding that a state can be deemed responsible for aiding and
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William Schabas distills the three elements necessary to establish the
139
international criminal complicity of secondary actors. Accountability for
corporate behavior implicating IHL first requires that an atrocity crime has
140
been committed by another actor. In Prosecutor v. Jelesic, the ICTY held
that considerations of whether the defendant aided and abetted the commission of genocide obliges the Trial Chamber to deduce if the constituting ac141
tion occurred. The second element requires that the corporate actor has
committed a material act that contributes to the perpetration of a crime. The
142
contours of this requirement, Schabas notes, are unsettled.
Proponents of a low threshold have advocated that even marginal acts
143
of assistance constitute complicity. More influential direction, however,
comes from the ICTY. Imposing a stringent standard, in Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Trial Chamber held that an act of complicity must be “direct and sub144
stantial.” This follows the standard assumed by the International Law
145
Commission. In its Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind, the ILC instructs that individual criminal responsibility extends to an actor that “knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly
146
and substantially, in the commission of such a crime. . .” The complicit
act, to satisfy the third element, must exhibit the intent and knowledge of
147
the legal or natural person that facilitates the underlying action. The ICTY
requires that a complicit actor must knowingly decide to participate in the
“planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abet148
ting in the commission of a crime.”

abetting in the commission of an international wrongful act by another state) [hereinafter
ARSIWA].
139.
See Schabas, supra note 11, at 446–49; See also Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Aiding
and Abetting in International Criminal Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1613–17 (2019).
140.
See Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
141.
Prosecutor v. Jelesic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 87 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999); see Prosecutor v. Akayseu, Case No. ICTR-96-4T, Judgement, ¶ 530 (Sept. 2, 1998) (establishing that complicity is not contingent on demonstrating the guilt of the principal actor); see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
142.
See Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
143.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 671 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (seeking to impose liability for participation in
a crime that would include contributing “in any manner whatsoever regardless of one’s specific role in the commission of the offending act”).
144.
Id. ¶ 691; see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
145.
See also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447
146.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 18 (1996) [hereinafter ILC, Crimes Against
Peace and Security].
147.
Schabas, supra note 11, at 448.
148.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 674 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
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Both states and corporations act through individuals. Mechanisms like
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (“ARSIWA”) determine when individual conduct is attributable to the
149
state. Parallels between the state and the corporation are useful points of
150
departure but are ultimately incomplete. Early appeals to ICL were, and
albeit to a lesser extent remain, limited by the principle societas delinquere
151
non potest. Assessments of accountability can target either the individual
representative or the corporate entity. Traditionally, and most commonly,
assessments begin by identifying relevant individuals before determining
whether the private actor is subject to criminal sanctions for actions implicating international law. These efforts to ensure accountability are, however,
limited by features of the corporate form.
Delegated management, under a board structure, is required to ensure
the efficient operation of an entity whose ownership is constantly chang152
ing. The corporate form provides governance structures that delegate decision-making between a board of directors and operational managers. This
imposes a legal separation between common business decisions and the rati153
fication of these decisions. Intended to check the value of the firm’s business conduct, such delegation complicates assessments of whether a corporate official knowingly made a direct and substantial contribution to the
commission of a core crime. Corporate law imposes liability for wrongful
154
acts committed by individuals operating in their formal capacity. The cor155
porate veil is firm but not impenetrable. However, assessments of individual responsibility may elude accountability through the nature of collective
decision-making. A corporate harm, an unquestioned set of facts, may occur
but attribution is avoided if an individual, possessing the requisite actus reus
156
and mens rea, is not identified. Complex management structures, the role
and operations of subsidiaries, and the bifurcated nature of decision-making
between the board and management create degrees of separation.
Drawing upon organizational theory, Meir Dan-Cohen identifies discontinuity between individual and collective preferences. Dan-Cohen describes how a corporate action—for present purposes, one that facilitates
commission of a core crime—is the product of “widely dispersed informa-

149.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 91–92 (2002).
150.
See DE JONGE, supra note 119, at 78–79.
151.
See generally Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 927 (2008).
152.
Armour, supra note 119, at 11–12.
153.
Id. at 12.
154.
See generally CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d
ed. 2001).
155.
See generally John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2010).
156.
Slye, supra note 114, at 962.
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tional sources and diffused individual interests and attitudes, all mediated by
structures, processes, and chance in ways that defy translating or tracing the
157
organizational decision into its individual sources.” Accountability gaps
occur when assessment of the corporate official’s involvement is derailed by
an inability to disentangle the individual’s contribution from the organizational nature of the corporation’s decision-making structure.
In the rare (or future) instance when international criminal liability is
158
pursued against a corporate entity, similar challenges are accentuated. The
various ICL tribunals offer differing evidentiary accounts of the mens rea
159
requirement. Article 30 of the Rome Statute holds that criminal liability is
160
contingent upon both knowledge and intent. This creates a threshold,
complicated by the corporate form, that may become unattainable when ap161
plied to complicit conduct. Satisfaction of this standard will, again, re162
quire that individual impetuses are parsed from collective structures. Describing the paradoxical task of assessing corporate mens rea, Vikramaditya
Khanna tells of how corporate structures may partition information, separating those that act from those that possess the requisite information about the
163
act’s implications. International legal developments that limit their remit
to only the most egregious acts—that inadequately conceptualize either the
contributory nature of corporate behavior or the particular features of the
corporate form—curtail the instances in which accountability for corporate
conduct implicating IHL may be pursued.

157.
MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1986).
158.
See Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Criminal Liability Under International Law: The
New TV S.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 13 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 313, 320 (noting the rarity of corporate liability in international tribunals);
See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d. Cir. 2010) (remarking that
international law has never extended the scope of liability to corporations).
159.
See Michael J. Kelley, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under International
Law, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 360 (2012).
160.
Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 30 (basing intent on meaningful engagement and
the purposeful cause of a consequence and holding that knowledge means awareness of a circumstance or the occurrence of a consequence).
161.
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending a purpose and knowledge-based standard to a corporate actor
accused of violating international law); see also Roger Alford, Second Circuit Adopts Purpose
Test for ATS Corporate Liability, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 2, 2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10
/02/second-circuit-adoptspurpose-test-for-ats-corporate-liability/; Kelley, supra note 159, at
354 (both demonstrating the difficulty of satisfying this standard in relations to corporate
complicity).
162.
V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 369–370 (detailing how a single actor standard, common in domestic legal systems, applies respondeat superior to attribute the actions and mens
rea of an offending agent to the corporate entity).
163.
Id. at 380–81.
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B. The Narrow Ambit of International Human Rights Law
Such a narrow scope is not limited to ICL. International human rights
law provides the most comprehensive international legal framework dedicated to the regulation of business entities. This framework acknowledges
the particular challenges posed by conflict to human rights. Yet the development of the UNGP and other IHRL-based initiatives afford IHL auxiliary
status within the dedicated mechanisms. The primary rules contained within
the human rights framework fail to adequately conceptualize common manifestations of corporate conduct within conflict zones and remain vulnerable
to features of the corporate form. First, accountability is eluded within spaces where the regulatory reach and primary rules imposed through IHRL fail
to recognize or treat the particular IHL implications of corporate conduct.
Avoidance is furthered by an under-articulated conception of complicity
that neglects conduct implicating IHL. And second, the principles of limited
liability and corporate separation have been extended to insulate corporations from accountability. These features of the corporate form compromise
164
the development and efficacy of regulatory frameworks.
Human rights law is often presented as the most effective means of advancing corporate responsibility. Preferred to criminal or civil pursuits, Michael Addo suggests that the pervasiveness of human rights law, its treatment of, and applicability to, an array of corporate activities, positions
165
IHRL as an efficacious means of advancing collective objectives. Howev166
er, the UNGP make limited reference to IHL. Its follow-up reports provide minimal elucidation about the content or applicability of specific IHL
167
norms and how these influence business operations within conflict areas.
Many of the prominent civil society initiatives that consider the perils of
conducting business within high-risk environments offer prescriptions found
168
only in IHRL. This narrow scope creates broad spaces in which forms of

164.
See Peter T. Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law, ¶ 4, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
165.
Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations—An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 3, 23–24 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
166.
See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, princs. 7, 12.
167.
See Special Representative Report 2011, supra note 81; see also John G. Ruggie
(Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in Conflict
Affected Regions: The Roles of States (2009), https://media.business-humanrights.org/media
/documents/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-conflict-project-note-Oct-2009.pdf [hereinafter
Special Representative Report 2009].
168.
See, e.g., YADAIRA ORSINI & ROPER CLELAND, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE
IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 11 (International Alert 2018) (acknowledging the occurrence of IHL violations in conflict affected areas and stating in a footnote that “whether
[these] conditions trigger specific and different considerations under [IHL] is an important but
separate consideration that requires targeted legal and expert advice); see also Shift, supra
note 80, at 2.

74

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:47

corporate conduct escape the regulatory attention of IHRL-based frameworks. The Special Representative’s report on Business and Human Rights
169
in Conflict-Affected Areas does not directly reference IHL. Instead, the
report encourages states to warn businesses that armed conflict raises the
likelihood of human rights abuses and to convey their expectations, through
legislation and regulation, regarding business conduct within such environ170
ments.
Inclusion of IHL is often limited to a reference. Its relevancy is noted
but rarely articulated. Collectively, the various instruments say little about
how IHL and IHRL norms interact. Do these interactions affect business
operations within conflict zones? Potential norm conflicts, frequent occurrences documented within the well-trodden debates regarding the parallel
171
application of these legal fields, go unremarked. This consideration is particularly pertinent within situations of occupation. Numerous courts and
treaty bodies have acknowledged IHRL and IHL’s dual application upon the
172
imposition of foreign control. The ICJ has recognized that within an occupation, instances occur in which particular rights are exclusively matters
of IHL, other rights will be the exclusive matter of IHRL, and others will be
173
relevant to both fields of law. Accountability gaps occur when business
conduct, ostensibly compliant with the requirements imposed through human rights law, infringes upon IHL-based norms that are undertheorized by
174
the prominent IHRL-based frameworks.
Such conduct is often indirect. IHRL offers a broad conception of com175
plicity. As this is, however, derived from ICL and domestic law, it shares
176
similar limitations to those identified above. The UNGP determines that
complicity arises when a “business enterprise contributes to, or is seen as

169.
Special Representative Report 2009, supra note 167.
170.
Id. at 1.
171.
See e.g., Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and
Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 95 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (providing an overview of the relationship between IHL and IHRL).
172.
See Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501 (2008) (providing a comprehensive review of the dual application
of IHRL and IHL in situations of armed conflict).
173.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 July 9)).
174.
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
175.
See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Clarifying
the Concepts of Sphere of Influence and Complicity,” ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15,
2008) [hereinafter HRC Clarifying Complicity].
176.
Id. ¶¶ 28, 33 (noting the origins of the complicity standard); see also DE JONGE,
supra note 119, at 79 (describing the challenges of imposing a complicity standard on corporate actors through a human rights framework).
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contributing to, adverse human rights impacts caused by other parties.”
Complicity is linked to the due diligence process and the corporate respon178
sibility to respect human rights includes avoiding complicity. The UNGP
does, however, move beyond ICL to recognize a parallel, non-legal, concep179
tion of complicity. The Global Compact further elucidates an IHRL-based
complicity standard. Principle Two explains that businesses should ensure
180
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. It acknowledges that
181
complicity may be direct, beneficial, or silent.
Despite these references, an IHRL-derived notion of complicity remains
undefined. John Ruggie notes that several conceptions of complicity—
designations that describe common forms of corporate conduct—are more
likely to be the source of social opprobrium than the cause of legal liabil182
ity. Ruggie’s clarification report holds that “given the variations in definitions of complicity within different legal contexts, it is not possible to specify exacting tests for what constitutes complicity even within the legal
183
sphere.” Considerations of international humanitarian law are largely ne184
glected by resulting IHRL complicity assessments. During this process, a
corporate actor may perform comprehensive due diligence to consider
whether its operations indirectly affect the human rights of others but fail to
consider how that same conduct influences specific IHL-based norms.
Such a scenario envisions a corporate official that operates in good faith
but is not structurally enticed to perform a more robust evaluation. The less
inclined actor may, however, purposefully appeal to features of the corporate form to blunt international law’s regulatory reach. The principle of limited liability serves as a contracting tool to tie a creditor’s claims to assets
that are owned by the firm. Limited liability protects shareholders by cap185
ping their risk at, in most instances, the amount of their financial outlay.
The principle, initially designed, protects against contractual claims so as to
186
facilitate diversification and passive investment. This allows risk-averse

177.
See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 18.
178.
Id.; see also HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶¶ 4, 26.
179.
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 18; see also HRC Clarifying Complicity,
supra note 175, ¶ 27.
180.
U.N. Global Compact, supra note 67, princ. 2.
181.
Id, at commentary to princ. 2.
182.
See HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶ 70; see also DE JONGE, supra
note 119, at 155.
183.
HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶ 33.
184.
But see ARSIWA, supra note 138, art. 16 (which provides a more robust account of
aiding and assisting).
185.
Armour et. al., supra note 119, at 9.
186.
Id. (noting that the compelling reasons for limited liability do not necessarily extend beyond the contractual context).
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187

investors to provide capital to uncertain ventures. Yet as early as the
188
eighteenth century, economists expressed skepticism.
Adam Smith
189
claimed that limiting liability would diminish responsibility. The limited
liability principle developed, as it was applied to corporate investors, to encourage what Marie-Laure Djelic and Joel Bothello term “de190
responsibilization.” This contributes to the desirability and construction of
business environments in which risk-taking is maximized and obligation is
191
reduced.
Such environments adversely affect how international legal initiatives
develop and how accountability mechanisms are implemented. Expansion
of the limited liability principle to insulate parent companies demonstrates
192
how prioritization of asset protection compromises accountability. Parent
193
companies are rarely deemed accountable for the actions of subsidiaries.
The corporate veil may be pierced if the parent directly controls and uses
194
the subsidiary to perform a wrongful act. This, however, is difficult to
195
demonstrate. In many jurisdictions, the presumption remains that the parent does not incur tortious liability for the acts of subsidiaries in all but the
196
rarest instances.
Subsidiaries, used strategically, become ephemeral. They can be formed
to undertake a singular transaction and distant the parent’s business interest
197
from legal consequences or negative connotations. By externalizing risk,
through subsidiaries and corporate separation, accountability is dimin-

187.
See Marie-Laure Djelic & Joel Bothello, Limited Liability and Its Moral Hazard
Implications: The Systemic Inscription of Instability in Contemporary Capital, 42 THEORY &
SOC’Y 589, 606–07 (2013).
188.
Id, at 602–03.
189.
Id.; see generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book V, Ch. 1 (1999).
190.
Djelic & Bothello, supra note 187, at 607.
191.
See Kirshner, supra note 112, at 264–65 (detailing how features of limited liability
can be used to shield parent corporations from liability incurred by subsidiaries).
192.
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61–64 (holding that liability protection
extends to the parents of subsidiaries). See generally Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited
Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human
Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2015) (tracing this expansion to when
states began allowing corporations to own the shares of other corporations in the 1880s).
193.
But see Kiarie Mwaura, Internalization of Costs to Corporate Groups: Part-Whole
Relationships, Human Rights Norms and the Futility of the Corporate Veil, 11 J. INT’L BUS. &
L. 85, 102–05 (describing the use of enterprise principles to ensure more encompassing regulatory efforts).
194.
Skinner, supra note 192, at 1773.
195.
Mwaura, supra note 193, at 101–02 (noting the absence of statutory rules that detail
when and under what conditions the corporate veil may be pierced).
196.
Skinner, supra note 192, at 1774; see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life
Ins., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998).
197.
See Butler, supra note 115, at 278–79.
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198

ished. Harmful conduct implicating IHL is compartmentalized. A parent
company can benefit enormously through the subsidiaries’ undertakings.
With effective corporate structuring, the parent maintains the profitable or
otherwise advantageous features of the relationship but through the corporate form achieves reputational distance and reduced liability. Norms derived from IHL are twice neglected. They are minimized within the IHRL
mechanisms that are most prominently applied to corporations and they are
prone to circumvention by the strategically inclined actor that insulates itself
from the accountability initiatives that are intended to curtail the harmful
effects of businesses that operate within conflict zones.

C. The Varying Nature of Domestic Law and Courts
199

Accountability initiatives are often pursued within domestic venues.
Due to meager enforcement prospects and through purposeful design, many
fields of international law rely upon domestic institutions to implement pri200
mary legal rules and provide remedies following violations. As alluded to
above, IHL is particularly reliant upon domestic mechanisms. Whether
treated through international criminal law or under the auspices of the relevant human rights mechanisms, domestic implementation assumes a cumulative role in ensuring accountability. Efforts to regulate corporate conduct
201
have developed accordingly and also rely upon such indirect methods.
The Geneva Conventions prescribe that violations of IHL—by a state, an
armed group, and as extended to corporate actors—compel domestic re202
dress. International criminal institutions are positioned as complementary
203
to national jurisdictions. And the UNGP is premised upon the protect, re204
spect, and remedy framework. Having precluded a binding corporate duty
to respect individual rights, accountability initiatives made through the
205
UNGP become contingent on domestic capabilities.

198.
See Kirshner, supra note 112, at 264–65.
199.
See Weill, supra note 82, at 860 (noting the importance of domestic courts in the
enforcement of international law).
200.
See UDHR, supra note 53, art. 8 (noting that everyone has the right to a remedy by
a competent national tribunal); see also ICCPR, supra note 55, art. 2(3) (ensuring that everyone whose rights are violated will have access to a remedy); David Bilchitz, Corporations and
the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental Rights in International Law, 23
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 156 (2016) (detailing how the right to a remedy is contingent on the strength of the domestic sphere).
201.
See generally Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct Vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations
Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005).
202.
See Weill, supra note 82, at 861. See generally ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011).
203.
Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 1.
204.
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 1.
205.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, 14, U.N. Doc A
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Such capabilities are, however, variable. Impressive gains have been
206
made throughout the post-Rome era. But jurisdictional and structural restrictions create instances in which accountability for corporate behavior
implicating IHL is limited. Gaps result from alterations within particular legal systems, divergences amongst various legal systems, and the tendency
of courts to preference IHRL-based considerations. Furthermore, particular
characteristics, explicit to the corporate form, may be employed to position
a firm beyond the reach of domestically-imposed accountability initiatives.
The once comprehensive reach of the ATS has, as noted, been narrowed. Earlier U.S. jurisprudence, culminating in Doe v. Unocal Corp., expanded the ATS’s remit to include human rights and IHL violations by cor207
porations and their executives.
A series of cases under the ATS
demonstrated how domestic courts could bolster enforcement of human
208
rights norms and ensure accountability for harmful corporate conduct. But
in what is now a familiar story, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Su209
preme Court limited the Act’s extraterritorial application. Uncertainty followed. Then, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that foreign
plaintiffs were unable to bring claims against foreign corporations under the
210
ATS. Jurisprudential shifts curtail opportunities to pursue redress through
domestic courts. The varying and then limited scope of domestic measures
further contributes to existing accountability gaps within which forms of
corporate behavior successfully circumvent the attention of domestic courts.
Similarly, the ability to pursue accountability through domestic venues
is jurisdictionally dependent. Although the International Commission of Jurists has documented the near universal availability of civil remedies, the
ability to initiate action against corporate actors accused of violating inter211
national law ranges. Several jurisdictions took strategic guidance from the
success of the pre-Kiobel ATS litigation. Lawyers outside of the United
States followed course, availing themselves of civil remedies in pursuit of
accountability for gross violations of international law by corporate ac-

/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (stating that the responsibility of business enterprises to respect
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, which remain defined
largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions); see also Bilchitz, supra note 200,
at 156 (noting that since corporations have no direct legal obligations towards individuals, no
legal remedy can be claimed against them unless the state has created obligations for corporations).
206.
See Weill, supra note 82, at 873. See generally Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry &
John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 767 (2001).
207.
See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir, 2002)
208.
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004).
209.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114–25 (2013).
210.
Jesner v. Arab Bank Plc., 138 S. Ct. 1368 (2018).
211.
See generally ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT, supra note 104.
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tors. These initiatives, however, remain limited. Several additional factors
bar individuals from successfully initiating domestic legal actions. The International Commission of Jurists notes the impediments created by power
imbalances between corporations and individuals, the lack of legal aid, cost
burdens, and low compensation, the restrictions posed by statutes of limita213
tions, and the principle of forum non conveniens. Collectively, such factors bar access and result in further accountability gaps in which numerous
214
forms of corporate conduct go untreated.
When accusations do reach a judicial body, domestic courts often limit
the scope of their engagements with international humanitarian law. While
this varies by jurisdiction, many national courts accentuate actions involving
their own nationals and remain reluctant to review decisions concerning the
215
use of force or which have security implications. When actions are
brought, courts commonly preference human rights-based considerations.
Often, this is to the exclusion of IHL. Sharon Weill notes that courts “increasingly tend to apply international human rights law during armed con216
flicts.” Courts may lack the necessary expertise to comprehensively en217
gage with norms derived from IHL. This poses similar challenges to those
identified above. Interactions between IHRL and IHL receive minimal consideration and an exclusive human rights-based approach risks underappreciating particular forms of corporate conduct that compromise IHL norms.
It is here too—within the domestic sphere where accountability initiatives often culminate—that the corporate form makes its most sizable contribution to the creation of accountability gaps. IHL-based norms are directly imposed upon corporate actors but implementation of accountability
218
measures, as we see, is largely reliant on domestic initiatives. The indirect
extension of international law’s regulatory reach has inadequately navigated
the public-private dimensions of the corporate form. A corporate actor that
wishes to elude accountability for controversial behavior may avail itself of
techniques, specific to the corporation, that allow a firm to circumvent in212.
Id. at 5–6.
213.
Id. at 43–44.
214.
See Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5 (2012). See
generally Ana María Mondragón, Corporate Impunity for Human Rights Violations in the
Americas: The Inter-American System of Human Rights as an Opportunity for Victims to
Achieve Justice, 57 HARV. INT’L. L. J. ONLINE 53 (2016);
215.
See Weill, supra note 82, at 873.
216.
Id.
217.
See Yahli Shereshevsky, HCJ 3003/18 Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights V.
Chief of General Staff, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 113 AM. J. INT’L. L. 361, 367–68.
218.
Vázquez, supra note 201, at 932; see also Craig Scott, Translating Torture into
Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 45, 47–48 (Craig Scott, ed.,
2001).
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ternational law’s vertical application. The place of incorporation rule en219
sures that a corporation may select a favoured governance regime.
220
Julian Arato describes how corporations augment their nationality. At
perhaps the highest level of abstraction, the elastic application of the corporate form upends the assumption that undergirds much of international law’s
regulatory payoff—that the corporation is solely a construct of national
221
law. The widely-shared belief that states are unwilling or unable to regulate corporate activity through domestic endeavors prompted the array of
222
international initiatives described throughout this article. Yet as international law’s regulatory agenda develops, it reverts to the domestic sphere.
Through indirect obligations that rely upon the state to create and enforce a
regulatory framework that reflects international norms; to ensure accountability for conduct implicating those duties prescribed directly, accountability
gaps widen when features of the corporate form create spaces between international initiatives to establish primary rules and the domestic actualization of secondary rules. A similar assessment holds when we consider state
conduct. Here, however, the corporation may avoid formal scrutiny by unduly moving between the domestic frameworks upon which international
223
norms rely.
Choice of law and choice of jurisdiction principles allow the inclined
224
corporation to avail of regulatory arbitrage. The commonality of place of
incorporation rules creates fluid business environments in which a corporate
entity is enabled to strategically select the domestic regulatory regime that

219.
See Armour et. al., supra note 119, at 21.
220.
Arato, supra note 122, at 275 (describing the corporation’s capacity to structure
investments through subsidiaries to allow it to avail itself of numerous investment treaties that
the parent would otherwise be unable to access).
221.
Id, at 275 (citing the classical formulation in Oppenheim’s International Law: “that
it is usual to attribute a corporation to the state under the laws of which it has been incorporated and to which it owes its legal existence”).
222.
Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 893, 896 (describing that states
are either incapable or unwilling to assert control over corporate activity); see also Ku, supra
note 118, at 736 (summarizing the widely-held belief that domestic regulation seems inadequate to regulate modern transnational corporations and that international law has become an
important means of controlling corporate behavior).
223.
Arato, supra note 122, at 283. See generally Ronald Daniels & Benjamin Alarie,
State Regulatory Competition and the Threat to Corporate Governance, in THE ART OF THE
STATE: GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS 165 (Thomas Courchene & Donald
Savoie, eds., 2003).
224.
See Magnus Willesson, What Is and What Is Not Regulatory Arbitrage? A Review
and Syntheses, in FINANCIAL MARKETS, SME FINANCING AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 71
(Giusy Chesini, Elisa Giaretta & Andrea Paltrinieri, eds., 2017) (in which regulatory arbitrage
is defined as an avoidance strategy of regulation that is exercised as a result of a regulatory
inconsistency).
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225

will govern its, or its subsidiaries, operations. Coupled with aggressive
regulatory planning, the corporation may effectively minimize legal and
226
regulatory constraints. Although arbitrage is generally associated with tax
reduction, securities disclosures, and similar regulatory costs, the principle
is transferable. A corporation motivated to bypass domestically imposed in227
ternational legal rules may engage an array of avoidance techniques.
Movements to regulate corporate conduct developed upon normative
assumptions about the nature of the corporation, in response to empirical
realizations about the influence accrued by corporate actors, and following
anecdotal accounts of corporate misdeeds. With collective force these efforts counterbalanced the classical formulation that a corporation’s principal
228
organizational purpose is to benefit its shareholders. Antonio Cassese
states that the earliest augmentations to traditional conceptions of legal sub229
jecthood occurred in response to armed conflict. But since Nuremberg’s
expansive promise, efforts to curtail corporate conduct within conflict zones
have developed haphazardly. The series of patchy frameworks, described
throughout this section, are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the corporate form. They have resulted in mismatches between primary rules, secondary rules, and, as will now be seen, the nature of corporate operations.

IV. (Re)Conceptualizing How Corporate Conduct
Implicates IHL
Friedrich Flick and his associates were indicted as individuals at the
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon declared
that history is replete with examples where great harm has been caused by
230
legal persons. In the intervening years, international law’s treatment of

225.
See Armour et al., supra note 119, at 21–22 (describing the prevalence of place of
incorporation rules in the United States and Europe).
226.
See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
227.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 811–12
(2005) (describing the governance implications of inversion transactions); see also Clifford
W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson, Financial Engineering: An Overview, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 3 (Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson
eds., 1990). See generally Michael Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation:
The Early History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 29 (2008).
228.
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (articulating the classical
formulation of the view that management must operate within the sole interests of its shareholders).
229.
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-249 (2001). See also Ku, supra
note 118, at 734.
230.
See Prosecutor v. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 82
(Oct. 2, 2014).
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corporate conduct has proceeded along different paths. Individualist and
collectivist, criminal or civil, binding legal obligations versus voluntary undertakings, the intervening developments reflect divergent understandings
of international law itself. The purpose here has not been to endorse one
such vision. Instead, this article considers how this bundle of hard and soft
legal techniques has been applied to corporations that operate within conflict zones. The resulting accountability initiatives each share commitment
to the belief that corporations are powerful entities and that they are capable
of contributing to social ills. We coalesce around the understanding that
corporations require regulatory attention but diverge on the means through
which greater accountability can be prescribed and implemented.
These undertakings are ongoing. The Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Working Group’s revised draft of the Legally Binding Instrument to Regu232
late the Activities of Transnational Corporations is progressing. The Ecuadorian initiative offers the potential of a binding instrument. It provides,
233
perhaps, the most detailed consideration of IHL to date. Civil society organizations, however, note that the draft document inadequately treats certain particularities of the link between business and conflict and the treaty’s
234
political prospects remain uncertain.
The process of determining how obligations attach to corporations requires a fuller conception of the varying ways that corporate conduct affects
IHL. As we have observed, features of the corporate form disrupt the application of existing accountability frameworks. A more encompassing theory
of international humanitarian law’s application to business conduct must also recognize how the particularities of corporate conduct influence norms
derived from IHL. These activities, and the motives that undergird them,
range from maleficent to banal. The nature of the implicated action tells
much about the need for the creation of a new, or the reiteration of an exist-

231.
Carsten Stahn, Liberals Vs Romantics: Challenges of an Emerging Corporate International Criminal Law, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 91, 102–03 (2018) (identifying two
competing schools, the first based upon the traditional liberal commitment to international
criminal justice and the second derived from a human rights tradition willing to hold collective entities responsible for abuses).
232.
See Carlos Lopez, The Revised Draft of a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: A
Big Leap Forward, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 15, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/08/15/therevised-draft-of-a-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights-a-big-leap-forward/.
233.
See U.N. Human Rights Council, Revised Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to
Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (July
16,
2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp
/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf.
234.
See e.g. Al-Haq, Submission to the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Feb. 28, 2019),
http://www.alhaq.org/cached_uploads/download/alhaq_files/images/stories/PDF/AlHaq_Binding_Treaty_IGWG_Call_for_Comments_and_Prop osals_28_February_2019.pdf.
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ing, primary rule; reveals an implementation challenge that affects the mode
of accountability through which liability can be imposed; or displays some
mixture of both.
I identify three broad categorizations of corporate activity that each implicate IHL: (i) as a direct violator; (ii) as a facilitator; and (iii) as an inci235
dental contributor. Each categorization encompasses varying levels of legal and moral culpability and affects IHL-based considerations in nonanalogous ways. Corporate activity escapes formal scrutiny when legal
standards are under-articulated or enforcement is absent. To better answer
the questions posed by business conduct within conflict zones, we must further align the aforementioned primary and secondary rules that regulate corporations with a more complete conceptualization of how the particularities
of business activity affects norms derived from international humanitarian
law. The following events are illustrative.

A. The Corporation as a Direct Violator
MALONEY: You fired this individual for handling a weapon
and being intoxicated, is that right?
PRINCE: The men operate with a clear policy. If there is to be
any alcohol consumed it’s eight hours between any time of consumption of alcohol. . .
MALONEY: Was he fired or not?
PRINCE: Oh yes, ma’am. He was fired.
MALONEY: OK. Have any charges been brought against him
in the Iraqi justice system?
PRINCE: I don’t believe, in the Iraqi justice system. I do believe—I know we’ve referred it over to the. . .
MALONEY: Justice Department. They told us they’re still
looking at it nine months later. Have any charges been brought
against him in the U.S. military justice system?
PRINCE: I don’t know.
MALONEY: Have any charges been brought against him in the
U.S. civilian justice system?
PRINCE: Well, that would be handled by the Justice Department, ma’am. I—that’s for them to answer, not me.
MALONEY: Other than firing him, has there been any sanction against him by any government authority? You mentioned you

235.
I use corporate activity and corporate conduct interchangeably and broadly to describe the various operations, practices, and objectives that corporations pursue in the course
of their business operations. I do not intend to limit these considerations to any particular entity and, as such, they are relevant to various forms of transnational business entities operating
within conflict zones or externally influencing the conduct of hostilities either directly or indirectly.
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fined people for bad behavior. Was he fined for killing the Iraqi
guard?
PRINCE: Yes, he was.
MALONEY: How much was he fined?
PRINCE: Multiple thousands of dollars. I don’t know the exact
number; I’ll have to get you that answer.
MALONEY: OK.
PRINCE: Look, I’m not going to make any apologies for what
he did.
MALONEY: OK. But. . .
PRINCE: He clearly violated our policies.
MALONEY: All right. We all—every American believes he
violated policies. If he lived in America, he would have been arrested and he would be facing criminal charges. If he was a member of the military, he would be under a court-martial. But it ap236
pears to me that Blackwater has special rules. . .
The exchange between Democratic Representative Carolyn Maloney
237
and Blackwater CEO Erik Prince concerned a year-old incident. Andrew
Moonen, a Blackwater employee, left a Christmas party in Baghdad’s Green
Zone. Stumbling drunk, Moonen approached Raheem Khalif, a security
guard for Iraq’s Vice-President. Following a brief exchange, Moonen shot
238
and killed Khalif. Neither Moonen nor Blackwater faced criminal sanc239
tion. The House Oversight Committee had, however, summoned Prince to
Washington for a different reason. The precipitating event that invited Congressional scrutiny—the now infamous Nisour Square massacre in which
seventeen Iraqi civilians were riddled with bullets and killed at a traffic circle in the once affluent neighborhood—placed Blackwater and the heretofore unfamiliar world of private military contractors within the public con240
sciousness. Committee members queried whether a PMC could be held
accountable for its actions. Throughout the four-hour testimony, Prince

236.
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Holds a Hearing on Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2007)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/articles/blackwater _hearing_100207.html/
[hereinafter Hearing on Private Security Contracting].
237.
See Eric Schmitt, Report Details Shooting by Drunken Blackwater Worker, N.Y.
(Oct.
2,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/world/middleeast/02
TIMES
shooting.html?fta=y.
238.
See John M. Broder, Ex-Paratrooper Is Suspect in a Blackwater Killing, N.Y.
(Oct.
4,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/middleeast/04
TIMES
contractor.html?hp.
239.
James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2010), https://www.nytimes. com/2010/10/21/world/21contractors.html.
240.
See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST
POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 13–18, 27 (2008).
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faced a barrage of questions and accusations. But there was not a single ref241
erence to IHL or to its regulatory scope.
We begin by acknowledging the obscene and the obvious. The spectrum of corporate conduct implicating IHL commences with a direct viola242
tion. A corporation that directly breaches IHL assumes high moral and legal culpability. As seen earlier, IHL regulates the conduct of a PMC or other
243
business entity whose activities are sufficiently linked to armed conflict.
Primary rules impose discernable obligations and secondary rules provide
various modes of implementation should the business entity disregard rele244
vant legal duties. In such instances, legal frameworks appear sufficiently
cognizant of the corporation’s capacity to directly violate legal precepts.
Gaps are not the result of unidentifiable norms but are commonly created by
245
inadequate implementation.
The observed mismatch between the emerging legal frameworks that
impose corporate responsibility and the ways that corporations function is
least severe in instances of a direct violation. New laws are not required. Instead, efforts to bridge accountability gaps and reduce regulatory deficits
that follow from a direct violation are better spent on realigning the primary
rules with their modes of operationalization. It is necessary to conceptualize
how the nature of corporate conduct, implicating IHL, eludes accountability
and how the resulting gaps differ from the familiar implementation challenges associated with state conduct. At least two factors differentiate the
corporate violation and affect the manner in which accountability frameworks are transposed from the state actor and applied to the corporate entity.
First: dispersed responsibility. When a state violates IHL, a clear line
runs from the existence of a duty, through the offending action, and to the
mode(s) of imposing accountability for the breach (even if implementation

241.
Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236.
242.
See HRC Standards of Responsibility, supra note 132, ¶ 30.
243.
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 144(2) (extending the obligation
to “other authorities” that assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons to be instructed as to the Conventions provisions); ARSIWA, supra note 138, arts. 5, 8 (extending a
state act to non-state entities empowered by the state and imposing responsibility on the state
for actions of individuals or groups exercising governmental authority); see also The Int’l
Committee for the Red Cross [ICRC], The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, ref. 0996 (Sept. 17, 2008) (applying the principle of superior responsibility to
the relationship between the state and PMCs). See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, Private
Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law, in FROM MERCENARIES TO
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 115 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, eds., 2007).
244.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL 1: RULES 551– 55 (2005) (detailing the customary nature of Rule 151 regarding individual responsibility for violations of IHL).
245.
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that failure to enforce existing
laws that directly or indirectly regulate business respect for human rights constitutes a significant legal gap).
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is inadequate). Deviations from this linearity occur when a corporation violates a primary rule. It is not immediately clear where accountability is most
effectively pursued. The place of incorporation, the jurisdiction in which the
violation occurred, and the home state of an implicated individual each pro246
vide potential venues. However, the proximity between the state and the
corporation influences accountability and creates a degree of separation not
otherwise present.
Home states are often unable or unwilling to monitor a corporation’s
IHL compliance. A PMC, for example, works throughout the world and for
various clients. A host state is best positioned to monitor the PMC’s adherence to legal requirements but this ability decreases when the PMC works
247
alongside foreign governments or other businesses. A host state will be in
close proximity to the violation. It is positioned to undertake investigative
obligations and impose accountability but a host state may prioritize low
248
regulatory barriers or lack enforcement capacity. As experienced in Iraq,
this lack of capacity can result from the imposition of terms by the home
state that insulate the corporation and complicate the host state’s ability to
249
implement secondary rules. Proximity is furthest removed in relation to
the state of an implicated individual. A home state whose national may have
violated IHL in a third-country is rarely positioned to monitor or address the
250
geographically varied corporate undertakings of their citizens abroad.
Second: the strategic value of the provided service. The implicated
business practice is likely to avoid international legal scrutiny if the corporation provides a service deemed indispensable by the host state. When applied to a corporation, accountability mechanisms are largely reliant upon
the state—the state that may derive enormous benefit from the corporation—to implement IHL-based constraints on the business whose conduct
constitutes a direct violation. PMCs like Executive Outcomes and Military
Professional Resources Inc. secured desired military results within protract-

246.
See Benjamin Perrin, Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military
Companies with International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 615
(2006).
247.
Id. at 616.
248.
Carlos Ortiz, Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding
Business of Commercial Security Provision, in GLOBAL REGULATION: MANAGING CRISES
AFTER THE IMPERIAL TURN 214, 218 (Kees van der Pijl, Libby Assassi & Duncan Wigan
eds., 2004).
249.
See Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 of 2004 (Iraq) (stating
that Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms
and conditions of their Contracts. . . and that Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal
process with respect to acts preformed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto).
250.
Perrin, supra note 246, at 618–19.
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251

ed conflicts. Blackwater was repeatedly praised, even by its detractors in
252
Congress, for providing security services and protecting U.S. officials. Efforts to further regulate Blackwater were opposed by President Bush. Administration officials sought to ensure immunity for PMCs through a re253
newed Status of Force agreement with Iraq. The President pronounced
that efforts to investigate Blackwater’s conduct would inhibit the ability of
254
the Presidency to protect national security.
Beyond such hyperbole, an inevitable tension results when the actor responsible for imposing accountability is beholden to the entity whose conduct is to be scrutinized. During Erik Prince’s Congressional testimony,
Representative Stephen Lynch noted:
The State Department employees, you protect them every single day. . .And I am sure there is a heavy debt of gratitude on the
part of the State Department for your service. And yet they are the
same people who are, in our system, responsible for holding you
accountable in every respect with your contract and the conduct of
your employees. . .that’s an impossible conflict for them to re255
solve.
The modes of imposing accountability are broader than Representative
Lynch suggests yet the acknowledged tension is real. Four Blackwater contractors were eventually charged following the Nisour Square massacre. Ini256
tially, their prosecution was dismissed by a Federal Court judge. Then,
facing mounting political pressure and at the behest of Vice-President
257
Biden, the Obama Administration appealed the dismissal. In 2014, the
contractors were convicted on various charges including first-degree murder
258
and voluntary manslaughter. Following a succession of appeals, an additional dismissal, and a retrial, the convictions were affirmed but the sen-

251.
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Introduction, in FROM MERCENARIES TO
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 1, 1 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, eds., 2007).
252.
See Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236; see also SCAHILL,
supra note 240, at 18 (citing President Bush commending Blackwater’s sacrifice and service
in Iraq).
SCAHILL, supra note 240, at 53.
253.
254.
See Press Release, The White House President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into Law (Jan. 28, 2008),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases /2008/01/20080128-10.html.
255.
Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236.
256.
United States v. Slough, CR 08-0360 RMU, 677 F.Supp.2d 112(D.D.C., Dec. 31,
2009).
257.
Anthony Shadid, Biden Says U.S. Will Appeal Blackwater Case Dismissal, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/ world/middleeast/24iraq.html
258.
Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/ blackwater-verdict.html.
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259

tences of three of the contractors would be halved. This modicum of justice was fleeting. Late in 2020, in the dwindling days of the Trump Administration, the President fully pardoned the four Blackwater contractors while
260
commending their service to the country.
Accountability frameworks are heavily dependent on the state to restrict
activity that serves the state’s interests. Of course, this is also true of many
261
legal expectations imposed upon a state whose own activities violate IHL.
Here, however, we suppose that legal engagement follows from the state’s
desire to, inter alia, benefit from the principle of reciprocity and avoid or
262
minimize reputational costs. Firms too, especially those that are public263
facing, experience reputational consequences. These can be considerable
but the concept of corporate resilience facilitates reinvention. Following the
Nisour Square massacre, Blackwater rebranded. It commissioned a widelycirculated video game in which players become heroic contractors entrusted
to protect aid workers in a fictional North African country besieged by war264
lords. Blackwater changed its ownership and board structure, altered its
265
name twice, and merged with another PMC. Notwithstanding Iraq’s refusal to renew Blackwater’s operational license, the new iteration of the
firm and its various subsidiaries continue to obtain profitable contracts from
266
the State Department. And, in August 2020, Erik Prince, who had left the
firm before its corporate reinvention but maintained his company’s trade-

259.
Sarah Grant, Trial Preview: Third Attempt to Convict Blackwater Guard for 2007
Massacre of Iraqi Civilians, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trialpreview-third-attempt-convict-blackwater-guard-2007-massacre-iraqi-civilians.
260.
Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Pardons Two Russia Inquiry
Figures and Blackwater Guards, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 2020), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/politics/trump-pardons.html. See also WHITE
HOUSE, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grants of Clemency, (Dec.
22,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretaryregarding-executive-grants-clemency-122220/.
261.
See, e.g., ARSIWA, supra note 138, arts. 30–31 (requiring a responsible state to
cease a wrongful act; provide guarantees of non-repetition, and make full reparations for the
injury caused).
262.
See generally ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
263.
See generally Bennett Freeman, Substance Sells: Aligning Corporate Reputation
with Corporate Responsibility, 51 PUB. RELS. Q. 12 (2006).
264.
Owen Good, Real-Life Mercenaries to Star in Blackwater, the Videogame, WIRED
(June 7, 2011), https://www. wired.com/2011/ 06/real-life-mercenaries-to-star-in-blackwaterthe-video-game/.
265.
Dara Lind, Why Four Blackwater Contractors Were Just Now Convicted of Killing
17 Iraqi Civilians in 2007, VOX (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/23/7047519
/blackwater-trial-nisour-square-massacre-2007-guilty-convicted.
266.
Id.
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mark announced in a radio interview that he was again providing security
267
services before defiantly concluding, “Blackwater is back.”

B. The Corporation as a Facilitator
The motto of Myanmar’s Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population is displayed on the walls of the bureaucracy’s offices in Naypyidaw:
268
The earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will. This
visceral message—encapsulating the nation’s ethnic divisions and motivating the systemic oppression of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority—culminated
269
in the 2017 “clearance operations.” On August 25, in the early morning,
the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (“ARSA”) launched a series of attacks against military installations in Northern Rakhine State. The United
Nation’s Fact-Finding Mission (“FFM”) would later describe the state’s re270
sponse to the attacks as “brutal and grossly disproportionate.” The FFM
report followed a familiar pattern. It provided background, set contexts, established facts, and studied events. It assessed the impact of policies that
amounted to egregious violations of international law. Deep inside the 441page report, within a section addressing the prevalence of hate speech, the
report’s authors identified and assessed the responsibility of an unexpected
actor—Facebook.
Facebook was adjudged to have enabled the spread of hateful rhetoric
that contributed to circumstances that, for two months in 2017, saw entire
271
segments of the Rohingya population targeted. Forty percent of the villag272
es in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung were destroyed. Médecins
Sans Frontières estimated that as many as 9,000 were killed during the first
273
month of violence. 725,000 were forced to leave their homes and flee to

267.
Seth Hettena, Erik Prince’s Private Wars, ROLLING STONE, (Oct. 25, 2020),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/erik-prince-libya-blackwater-rogerstone-trump-2020-election-1077089/.
268.
Thomas Manch, For Muslims Across Myanmar, Citizenship Rights a Legal Fiction,
JUSTICEINFO (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/36058-formuslims-across-myanmar-citizenship-rights-a-legal-fiction.html.
269.
Stephanie Nebehay, Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Rohingya Return: U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarrohingya-un/brutal-myanmar-army-operation-aimed-at-preventing-rohingya-return-u-nidUSKBN1CG10A
270.
U.N. Hum Rts. Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ¶ 751, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17,
2018) [hereinafter U.N. FFM].
271.
See id.
272.
See id. ¶ 959.
273.
MSF Surveys Estimate That at Least 6,700 Rohingya Were Killed During the Attacks in Myanmar, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.msf.org
/myanmarbangladesh-msf-surveys-estimate-least-6700-rohingya-were-killed-during-attacksmyanmar.
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274

Bangladesh. The events were characterized, in a near-unanimous vote by
275
the U.S. House of Representatives as constituting genocide. The ongoing
campaign featured a series of recurring attacks. Infantry divisions from the
Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, partnered with sympathetic armed groups
and ethnic Rakhine civilians. They set fire to entire townships. They shot
indiscriminately into homes and at masses of people. The FFM found that
the operations were pre-determined. They were consistent with the vision of
General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw who
commenced the assault on Rakhine State by declaring: “The [Rohingya]
problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in
276
office is taking great care to solve the problem.”
The clearance operations disregarded civilian life. They sought to dispel
an entire population. A series of IHL and human rights violations were documented. Movement was restricted, forced evictions common, humanitarian
access was denied, and food and property were frequently confiscated. Sexual and gender-based violence became routine. The Tatmadaw ignored the
principle of distinction. They failed to take any feasible precautions to minimize incidental harm. Myanmar’s conduct was disproportionate and constituted a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” said the High Commission277
er for Human Rights.
Ethnic conflict is almost always preceded by long campaigns of denouncement, nationalism, and dehumanization. Sporadic occurrences of
ethnic violence had become periodic features of Myanmar’s transition from
military rule. In Shan State in 2011 and the following year in Northern
Rakhine—as foreign investment followed democratic reforms and as Aung
San Suu Kyi entered Parliament—violent outbreaks became harbingers of
the sustained series of atrocities that culminated in the clearance operations.
One event was notable. In 2014, riots in Mandalay began after rumors circulated that a Muslim café owner had raped a Buddhist employee. The accusation was false. It was manufactured to raise tensions, to sow intercommunal
278
discord. Such forms of incitement had occurred in the past but now the

274.
U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 751.
275.
See Nahal Toosi, House Calls Rohingya Crisis a Genocide, Urges Pompeo to Take
a Stand, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/13/rohingyahouse-resolution-pompeo-1063111.
276.
U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 752.
277.
Id, ¶¶ 1275–1286; Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Darker and More Dangerous: High
Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council on Human Rights Issues in 40 Countries,
OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/News
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22041&Lang
ID=E.
278.
See Timothy McLaughlin, How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in
Myanmar, WIRED (June 7, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueledchaos-and-confusion-in-myanmar/; see also U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 744 (detailing how
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reach of disinformation carried an unforetold scope as the incitement campaign against Myanmar’s Rohingya minority was fostered, and then disseminated, via Facebook.
Five years earlier, less than one percent of the country’s population regularly accessed the internet. Following liberalization, Facebook became
ubiquitous, the importance of an online profile likened to the necessity of a
279
home address. In Myanmar, the social network experienced its fastest
280
growth of any global market. In 2017, Myanmar’s 18 million users, a plurality of the country’s population, received some or all of their news from
281
the website. Tensions between the Rohingya and segments of the Buddhist majority grew as Facebook increased its national reach and influence.
While patterns of online disinformation and incitement are commonplace,
282
their occurrence in Myanmar has been deemed distinctive. Hateful rhetoric spread and carried salience amongst a population that had only recently
embraced social networks. Facebook actively courted market share in Myanmar. Network providers incentivized the use of the social media site. In
2016, Facebook joined with Myanmar Post and Telecommunications to
launch specific versions of the platform that were designed to maximize us283
age and reliance.
Notwithstanding the benefits of increased communication and
knowledge dissemination, the Rohingya were subjected to a centralized dis284
information campaign. The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission documented myriad postings. These reached millions of users. Often, the messages originated
from state officials or influential community and religious leaders. Through
Facebook posts, users were cautioned of an impending “Islamic takeover”
and warned of the harm that the Muslim population posed to the Buddhist
285
majority. The Rohingya were the subject of dismissive screeds that echoed familiar tropes of dehumanization. The FFM cited the facilitatory effect
286
of this hate speech and incitement.

“outside instigators” paid the accusers and sought to instigate violence in response to the alleged crimes).
279.
See McLaughlin, supra note 278.
280.
Id.
281.
Id.; see also Survey of Burma/Myanmar Public Opinion: March 9-April 1, 2017,
INT’L
REPUBLICAN
INST.
46
(2017),
https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files
/8.25.2017_burma_public_poll.pdf (noting that 73% of those surveyed received either all,
most, or some of their news from Facebook).
282.
U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 1342.
283.
Id. ¶ 1344 (noting that the launch of the “Free Basics” and “Facebook Flex” versions of the site were specifically designed for Myanmar and would allow users to access a
stripped-down form of Facebook without incurring data charges from their network provider).
284.
Id. ¶ 1346.
285.
Id. ¶ 1347.
286.
Id. ¶ 1354.
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Facebook’s role was noticeable. Civil society organizations warned that
Facebook’s investment in Myanmar was not commensurate with its efforts
287
to regulate the use of its platform. Facebook was accused of minimizing
its enablement of harmful rhetoric and of failing to impart processes to stem
288
the flow of information that would lead to violence. Subsequent efforts,
pledged by the firm’s leadership following increasing attention and negative
289
publicity, were widely dismissed by industry observers as insufficient.
Critics noted that Facebook had, since at least the 2014 Mandalay riots,
290
been aware of how its platform facilitated violence in Myanmar. Despite
functioning as the nation’s preeminent communicative medium, Facebook
had failed to cooperate with the FFM’s efforts to further diagnose the extent
291
of the social network’s contributory role. The fact-finding report called
for further research into the ways that Facebook contributed to the increase
292
of discrimination and violence in Myanmar. And, more recently, in early
June 2020, The Gambia initiated discovery proceedings in a U.S. District
Court to compel Facebook to provide data concerning various Burmese of293
ficials. The discovery attempt is intended to support The Gambia’s ICJ
case, currently pending against Myanmar, for breach of the 1948 Genocide
294
Convention.
Business operations, contemporary models that implicate IHL, frequently diverge from the well-regulated, paradigmatic case of the military
contractor. Commonly, the corporation assumes a secondary or faciliatory

287.
See Open Letter from Six Myanmar Civil Society Organizations to Mark Zuckerberg, (Apr. 5, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rs02G96Y9w5dpX0Vf1LjWp6B9
mp32VY-/view [hereinafter Open Letter], see also Paul Mozur, Groups in Myanmar Fire
Back at Zuckerberg, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/ technology/zuckerberg-facebook-myanmar.html
288.
See Open Letter, supra note 287 (noting that Facebook over-relies on third-party
moderators, lacks necessary mechanisms for emergency escalation, did not engage local
stakeholders, and failed to ensure transparency).
289.
See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 287 (noting Mark Zuckerberg’s response to questions in a Congressional hearing in which he stated that Facebook would increase its local
language content reviews, remove accounts that generated hate speech, and introduce marketspecific products).
290.
Id.
291.
U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 1354.
292.
Id.
293.
Application for Order to Take Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1782, The Republic of The Gambia v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-mc-00036-JEB (D.D.C. filed June 8, 2020),
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.218820/gov.uscourts.dcd.
218820.1.1.pdf.
294.
See generally Jenny Domino, Gambia V. Facebook: What the Discovery Request
Reveals About Facebook’s Content Moderation, JUST SEC. (July 6, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71157/gambia-v-facebook-what-the-discovery-request-revealsabout-facebooks-content-moderation/.
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295

role. The nature of this role, the form of corporate conduct, dictates the
level of legal or moral culpability that attaches to the business entity. Exam296
ples range. Actions deemed purposefully faciliatory may reach the level
of aiding and abetting. Here, the corporation becomes an accomplice. Such
occurrences are familiar and international criminal law and domestic legal
mechanisms impose accountability in such instances. Gaps result from inadequate implementation, often caused by a narrowly construed notion of
297
complicity.
Commonly, the corporation’s contribution to the facilitatory act will be
298
less direct. Faciliatory contributions, as defined here, include instances in
which the corporation purposefully aligns or willfully neglects the relationship between business operations and the consequences of its actions. Moral
culpability may be reduced in such instances. The corporation’s conduct
may not exhibit the purposeful intent required by the ICTY and the ILC to
299
establish the crime of complicity under international criminal law. But as
witnessed in Myanmar, corporate activity (or inactivity) can affect IHL in
unforeseen ways. In such scenarios, the corporation does not directly contribute to the implicated events. The proximate cause is further removed.
Instead, the corporation may derive benefit. It neglects the harmful implications of its actions or inactions. And, increasingly through new technologies
and novel business models, the corporate contribution becomes a conduit
that facilitates activity that itself compromises IHL-based norms.
Once described as a drama of great complexity and intensity, understandings of complicity have broadened since the Statute of the International
Military Tribunal extended responsibility to those “instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
300
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes. . .” Today, understand-

295.
Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 349, 351 (2009).
296.
U.N. Global Compact, supra note 67, at Principle 2 (acknowledging that complicity
may be direct, beneficial, or silent).
297.
See Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maaß, Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and its Challenges, 8 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 702 (2010).
298.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: A Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights
Abuses, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (finding that 41% of the incidents
surveyed featured indirect human rights violations by corporations).
299.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 674 (holding that a
complicit actor must knowingly decide to participate in the planning, instigating, ordering,
committing, or aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime); see also ILC, Crimes
Against Peace and Security, supra note 146, art. 2(3)(d).
300.
See Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace of Mankind, ¶
38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/430 (Apr. 6, 1990) (citing Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam who
notes the complexity of defining complicity); see also IMT Statute, supra note 28, art. 6.
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ings of corporate complicity may impose ethical or legal consequences.
The nature of the requisite material act and the degree to which an actor
302
must contribute to the commission of a crime remain open questions. Discrepancies between knowledge and purpose-based standards delineate asso303
ciated legal debates. Whether a secondary actor that facilitates a primary
violation is criminally complicit or ethically compromised is both factspecific and is influenced by the particular regime applied to reach a deter304
mination.
But my immediate purpose here is not prescriptive. Instead, it is to
acknowledge that as the relevant accountability frameworks develop, it is
necessary to forefront expansive conceptions of complicity with fuller accounts of how varying forms of corporate conduct indirectly implicate IHL
norms. Corporate activity reaches further than previously foreseen, expanding the proximity between the implicated conduct and the principle harm.
The influence of hate speech and false information, disseminated through
305
social media platforms, now receives heightened attention. Yet numerous
forms of corporate activity—emanating from new sectors and manifesting
in under-regulated spaces—are rapidly developing. The ways in which these
developments will influence IHL remain under-conceptualized. Seven of the
306
ten largest companies in the world are now technology firms. Within this
sector alone, rapidly evolving services, provided by the world’s largest
companies, present emerging challenges to the legal frameworks that govern
the conduct of warfare.
In 2013, the Islamic State began using YouTube and Twitter to recruit,
307
fundraise, and train thousands of foreign fighters. Soon, so too were each

301.
See Andrew Clapham, Corporations and Criminal Complicity, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND DISINVESTMENT 222, 223 (Gro Nystuen, et al., eds., 2011)
(citing the Norwegian Council on Ethics and Government Pension Fund – Global whose
guidelines promote a dualist approach to account for corporate conduct that violates international law or constitutes unethical corporate behavior not amounting to a legal violation)
[hereinafter Clapham, Criminal Complicity].
302.
Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
303.
Clapham, Criminal Complicity, supra note 301, at 231.
304.
See HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶¶ 33–62.
305.
See generally Eitan Diamond, Killing on Camera: Visual Evidence, Denial and
Accountability in Armed Conflict, 6 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 361 (2018). See also Tamar Megiddo, Online Activism, Digital Domination, and the Rule of Trolls: Mapping and Theorizing
Technological Oppression by Governments, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 394 (2020);
Björnstjern Baade, Fake News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1357 (2019); Evelyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law Is a Mess, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-law-mess.
306.
Luca Ventura, World’s Largest Companies 2019, GLOB. FIN. (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.gfmag.com/ global-data/economic-data/largest-companies (noting the ten largest
companies as measured by market capitalization).
307.
See Scott Gates & Sukanya Podder, Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the
Islamic State, 9 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 107 (2015).
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of the numerous non-state armed groups operating in Syria. Israel’s Min309
istry of Foreign Affairs funded an “internet warfare squad.” During Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”)
and Hamas both employed a social media strategy to present competing nar310
ratives. The IDF’s targeting and operational decisions were influenced by
311
social media determinations. When the ICC indicted Mahmoud AlWerfalli in 2017, the decision was based upon evidence found on popular
312
video sharing sites. The NGO Bellingcat used images and videos captured
from across the internet to determine that a Russian supplied surface-to-air
313
missile was used to down Flight MH17 in Ukraine. And the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) publicized its ongoing research on “military memetics” which analyzes the weaponization of memes
314
as part of information warfare and influence operations.
Social media now affects how conflicts are initiated. It has altered the
capacity and reach of non-state armed groups. It contributes to determinations of when and how force will be deployed, the manner in which legitimacy is asserted, and the enforcement and monitoring of international law.
IHL provides guidance on some of these emerging questions. Ruses of war
315
are permitted practices but IHL prohibits acts of perfidy. As per the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, misinformation constitutes
316
a ruse. The Tallinn Manual clarifies that transmitting false information is
317
permissible. This has been interpreted to include the dissemination of

308.
P.W. SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKE WAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF
SOCIAL MEDIA 9 (2018).
309.
Rona Kuperboim, Thought-Police Is Here, YNET NEWS, (Oct. 7, 2009),
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/ 0,7340,L-3744516 ,00.html.
310.
SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 308, at 194-195.
311.
Id. at 9.
312.
Emma Irving, And So It Begins. . .Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant, OPINIO JURIS, (Aug. 17, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-socialmedia-evidence-in-an-icc-arrest-warrant/.
313.
Bellingcat, “A Birdie is Flying Towards You:” Identifying the Separatists Linked to
the Downing of MH17, BELLINGCAT (June 19, 2019), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/ukand-europe/2019/06/19/identifying-the-separatists-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/.
314.
SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 308, at 191; see also Memes That Kill: The Future of Information Warfare, CB INSIGHTS (May 3, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com
/research/future-of-information-warfare/.
315.
See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
arts. 23(b), 24, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631 (stating that it is forbidden “to kill
or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” and “ruses of war
and the employment of methods necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the
country are considered permissible”).
316.
First Additional Protocol, supra note 19, at art. 37(2).
317.
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, Rule 61 (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2017).
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“fake news.” Yet, as observed in Myanmar, misleading communications
can threaten peremptory norms. To determine how an evolving understanding of complicity may ensure accountability for corporate conduct that affects IHL in previously uncontemplated ways we must more fully conceptualize the emerging forms of corporate behaviour—intentional and inciincidental—and how these encroach upon IHL’s normative purpose.

C. The Corporation as an Incidental Contributor
From your computer, enter a familiar URL. Through a trusted site at the
forefront of the shared economy, one scrolls through vacation rentals in Israel. Accommodation in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv has become prohibitively
expensive. Move further from your preferred destination and you find more
for less. Listed at $344 per week, through Airbnb, one can book a “double
319
room in a spacious modern flat in the center of Ariel.” Two people may
stay in the private room, fully furnished with a double bed. It features a fireplace and offers convenience. The advert tells that Ariel is suitably located
320
with easy access to all main highways. It is an hour on the bus to the
beach or a 45-minute drive to the Old City’s holy sites. The advert, however, omits that Ariel is a large Israeli settlement located in the heart of the
West Bank. It omits that the shared flat has been constructed on occupied
territory and in violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Conven321
tion. Instead, the advert tells guests that Ariel is not merely contiguous
with, but incontrovertibly constitutes a part of, Israel.
Airbnb has become embroiled in an ongoing debate regarding the con322
duct of business within occupied territory. In November 2018, Airbnb issued a press release. Responding to critics, it conceded: “when we applied
our decision-making framework, we concluded that we should remove list-

318.
See Unnati Ghia, International Humanitarian Law in a Post-Truth World,
CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. POST (Dec. 17, 2018), http://cilj.co.uk/2018/12/17/internationalhumanitarian-law-in-a-post-truth-world/.
319.
Double Bedroom in a Welcoming Flat, AIRBNB, www.airbnb.ca/rooms
/8470399?source_impression_id= p31569495341vAsxAkr %2Bojsuh2Sk&guests=1&adults=
1&sl_alternate_dates_exclusion=true&check_in=2019-10 -02&check_out=2019-10-09 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2020).
320.
Id.
321.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49(6); see S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar.
22, 1979); G.A. Res. 32/20, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25, 1977) (affirming Israel’s presence within the West
Bank constitutes a belligerent occupation); see also David Hughes, Moving from Management
to Termination: A Case Study of Prolonged Occupation, 44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 109 (2018).
322.
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land: Tourist Rental Listings in West Bank Settlements (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/11/20/bedand-breakfast-stolen-land/tourist-rental-listings-west-bank-settlements; see also Stolen Homes
Campaign, JEWISH VOICES FOR PEACE, https://jewish voiceforpeace.org/stolen-homes/ (last
visited Sept. 26, 2020) (a joint-campaign between American Muslims for Palestine,
CODEPINK: Women for Peace, Friends of Sabeel North America, Jewish Voice for Peace,
SumOfUs, and the US Palestinian Community Network).
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ings in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank that are at the core of
323
the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians.” Controversy was immediate. Israel denounced the decision as “shameful” and promised legal ac324
325
tion. Lawyers were retained and suits were filed. The Simon Wiesenthal
Center called the delisting draconian, a move that empowered terrorists, and
326
demanded a worldwide boycott of Airbnb. Without hesitation, the Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts placed Airbnb on a blacklist of companies
327
that boycott Israel. Florida threatened retaliatory action. Governor DeSantis warned that the company would be placed on a “hit list” and VicePresident Pence promised his Administration would make it clear that the
delisting “has no place in the free enterprise of the United States of Ameri328
329
ca.” In April 2019, Airbnb reversed its decision.
Today, owners may list and users may rent properties in West Bank settlements. The legal rejoinders offered both to the initial delisting and in response to the subsequent reversal follow identifiable paths. In Silber et al. v.
Airbnb, a group of Israeli-Americans that owned and listed West Bank
properties on the website and a group that identified as prospective renters
told the U.S. District Court of Delaware that the decision to remove their
330
property violated the Fair Housing Act. Their claim was settled and the

323.
Listings in Disputed Regions, AIRBNB (Nov. 19, 2019), https://press.airbnb.com
/listings-in-disputed-regions/.
324.
Airbnb: Israeli Uproar as Firm Bars West Bank Settlements, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-46273938.
325.
See Amanda McCaffrey, Palestinians Claim Violations by Israeli Settlers in Airbnb
Case in U.S. Courts, JUST SEC. (May 7, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63938
/palestinians-claim-violations-by-israeli-settlers-in-airbnb-case-in-u-s-court/.
326.
Hugo Martin, Airbnb Won’t Operate in Israel’s West Bank, Prompting Calls for a
Boycott, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-westbank-20181119-story.html.
327.
Marcy Oster, Texas Blacklists Airbnb Over Israeli Settlement Boycott, HAARETZ
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/texas-blacklists-airbnb-over-israelisettlement-boycott-1.6983940.
328.
David Simley, Florida Governor Warns Airbnb to Reverse its West Bank Policy or
Face State Sanctions, MIA. HERALD (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news
/politics-government/state-politics/article224556770. Html; see also Ron Kampeas, Pence on
Airbnb Settlements Ban: BDS Has ‘No Place’ in U.S. Market, HAARETZ (Dec. 2, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/pence-on-airbnb-settlements-ban-bds-has-no-place-in-u-smarket-1.670 2127.
329.
Julia Jacobs, Airbnb Reverses Policy Banning Listings in Israeli Settlements in
West Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world
/middleeast/airbnb-israel-west-bank.html.
330.
Amended Complaint at 9, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del. Aug.
23, 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-01884-RGA), https://www.just security.org/wp-content/uploads/2019
/04/Silber-Amended-Complaint.pdf.

Michigan Journal of International Law

98

[Vol. 42:47

331

case dismissed. Under the terms of the settlement, Airbnb reiterated that
“it would not move forward with implementing the removal of listings in
332
the West Bank from the platform.”
When stripped of its political veneer, the described events, tell of a corporate entity whose business practice in the West Bank may be understood
as mirroring its corporate conduct elsewhere. Airbnb operates in Ariel as it
does in Tel Aviv, Madrid, or Tokyo. Its policy in the Palestinian territories
attracts scrutiny not due to the nature of Airbnb’s general operations but because of the context within which these occur. The proximity between the
corporate action and the primary harm is greater than that which constitutes
faciliatory conduct. Unlike Facebook’s operations in Myanmar, which were
purposely tailored to the market and are alleged to have neglected the harm
caused, corporate operations are unchanged. Here, the implicated action
333
would likely fail to meet even a low complicity threshold. The corporation
does not engage in a positive act or omission that then contributes to the im334
plicated behavior. In such instances, corporate conduct affecting IHL is
incidental. It is a subsidiary contribution that supplements a more direct
form of (likely state) conduct.
Courts have traditionally maintained that corporations are not liable,
criminally or civilly, when their conduct amounts to normal business prac335
tice. Incidental contributions occur within the scope of regular operations
when corporate officials are unaware of the state’s intentions or the consequences of their actions. However, in such instances the nature of corporate
operations can further the interests that the primary (state) actor wishes to
impose. This may affect IHL’s normative purpose in ways that are often absent from associated deliberations.
In the Airbnb case, proponents viewed the initial removal decision as
336
advancing corporate accountability. Several Palestinian groups, intervening in Silber, argued that their inability to access the rental properties central
to the initial claim amounted to discrimination and unjustly enriched the

331.
Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del.
Aug. 23, 2019), (No. 1:18-cv-01884-RGA), https://www.courtlist ener.com/recap
/gov.uscourts.ded.67050/gov.uscourts.ded.67050.18.0.pdf.
332.
Update on Listings in Disputed Regions, AIRBNB (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://press.airbnb.com/update-listings-disputed-regions/.
333.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 671 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (in which the Prosecutor argues in favor of a
low threshold).
334.
Airbnb’s subsequent decision to relist the properties may, however, alter such categorizations.
335.
See Skinner, supra note 192, at 1845; see also Texas & Pac. Ry., Co. v. Behymer,
189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
336.
See, e.g. Israel: Airbnb to End Settlement Rentals, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 20,
2018), https://www.hrw.org/ news/2018/11/20/israel-airbnb-end-settlement-rentals.
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plaintiffs. The intervenors recalled that IHL provides the appropriate legal
framework to assess the legality of the settlements but they primarily ad338
dressed the plaintiffs’ ownership claims. Airbnb’s contribution was
deemphasized and subsequently the intervenors’ petition was dismissed af339
ter the case settled. IHL assumed but a small role within the ongoing debate.
340
A human rights discourse was prioritized. Yet despite this prevailing
approach, Airbnb’s West Bank policy raises crucial considerations specific
to IHL. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has asserted that:
Businesses play a central role in furthering the establishment,
maintenance and expansion of Israeli settlements. They are involved in constructing and financing settlement homes and supporting infrastructure, providing services to the settlements, and operating out of them. In doing so, they are contributing to Israel’s
confiscation of land, facilitate the transfer of its population into the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, and are involved in the exploitation
341
of Palestine’s natural resources.
The IHL implications are explicit. The settlements themselves directly
violate the Fourth Geneva Convention’s prohibition on the transfer of parts
of an occupying power’s civilian population into the territory that it occu342
pies. Settlements contribute to the occupation’s permanence. Under IHL,

337.
See Motion to Intervene on Behalf of Putative Intervenors and Counterclaim Plaintiffs Ziad Alwan, Village of Jalud, Municipality of ‘Anata, and Rada Wahbe and Memorandum of Law in Support at 1–2, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (No. 18-cv-01884RGA) (citing an Israeli Military Order prohibiting Palestinians in the West Bank from accessing the settlements).
338.
See id.
339.
Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01884-RGA, 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del. Aug.
23, 2019); see also Silber, et al. v. Airbnb, CTR. CONST. RTS. (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/silber-et-al-v-airbnb.
340.
See Amnesty Int’l, Destination Occupation: Digital Tourism and Israel’s Illegal
Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories at 8, MDE 15/9490/2019 (2019),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/01/destination-occupation-digital-tourismisrael-illegal-settlements/ (claiming that digital tourism companies operating in Israeli settlements violate human rights law by contributing to and profiting from the maintenance of settlements); see also Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land, supra note 322, at 5 (in which Human
Rights Watch and Kerem Navot state that online marketplaces contribute to the financial viability of settlements); Sari Bashi, If the U.S. Government Won’t Act, Airbnb Will, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Nov. 27, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/27/if-the-u-s-government-wontact-airbnb-will-west-bank-settlements-rentals-occupation-israel-palestinians-netanyahu/ (extending similar criticisms to other occupied territories including Northern Cyprus and Western
Sahara).
341.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/39 (Feb. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Report of the High
Commissioner 2018].
342.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49(6).
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343

occupation is conceived as a temporary regime. Temporality and the principle of sovereign preservation provide the normative core of the law of occupation. Their maintenance is necessary to ensure an occupation regime’s
344
legitimacy.
Moral and legal liability is at its lowest ebb when corporate conduct affects IHL incidentally. But the absence of moral opprobrium and explicit
legal prohibitions are not commensurate with the significance of such forms
of conduct. This detachment—between responses and effects—results from
instances when the consequences of corporate conduct are insufficiently
conceptualized. Under-theorization creates broad spaces in which the implications of various forms of corporate conduct occur beyond the reach of the
prominent accountability frameworks. As these frameworks develop, it is
necessary to further conceptualize the various ways that particular forms of
business conduct can affect IHL’s foundational purpose.
It is, of course, an overstatement to imply that the settlements’ viability
is contingent upon whether they may be listed on a particular website. The
pertinent questions, from the perspective of IHL, should, however, concern
the extent to which Airbnb’s business activities contribute to the settlement
enterprise’s prolongment, to their normalization. Do they compromise the
norms central to an occupation regime? Assessment will consider how Israel, the occupying power, endeavors to generate tourism within and attract
businesses to the settlements. Israel views its associated policies as a strategic means of maintaining control of both the settlements and the West
345
Bank.
Accordingly, ninety settlements are designated as “national priority are346
as.” This enables the Government of Israel to provide financial enticements to prospective businesses—both domestic and international—as a
means of encouraging economic expansion into the nominated settle343.
As per Article 42 of the Hague Convention, “territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” See Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 42,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631. Further, Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that the “present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2. In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the
present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.” See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 6.
344.
See Hughes, supra note 321, at 156–57; see also AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON
THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, 3–4 (2017).
345.
Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341, ¶ 43; see also U.N. Hum.
Rts. Council, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/39 (Feb. 27-Mar. 24,
2017) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report 2017].
346.
Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341, ¶ 43; see also Chaim Levinson, Settlement Housing Gets Third of Israeli State Funds for ‘National Priority’ Areas,
HAARETZ (Jan. 21, 2015, 5:37 PM), https://www.haaretz.com /.premium-national-priorityarea-funds-go-to-settlements-1.5363270.
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347

ments. Reductions in the price of land, development and infrastructure
348
grants, and tax incentives are used to induce business development. Tour349
ism is prioritized. In 2016, Israel adopted a Resolution allocating NIS 5
350
million to develop the West Bank’s tourism industry. Further funds were
earmarked to increase the development of tourist accommodation throughout the West Bank. Yariv Levin, Israel’s Tourism Minister, announced:
“After years of trying, for the first time today, the Ministry of Tourism will
financially support the establishment of hotels and motels in Judea and Samaria [West Bank]. Over the past few years, we have been witnessing the
development of tourism in this region, many attractions were cultivated and
351
a need to incentivize hotels has risen.”
The geographic footprint of Israel’s West Bank commercial activity
352
now exceeds the total area of residential settlements. A business entity
that, willingly or passively, contributes to annexationist objectives furthers
the policies of an occupying power to assume permanent control, implicates
IHL’s normative purpose. Yet these considerations are often absent from the
resulting legal discourses. They remain untreated by the applicable legal
frameworks. Legal mechanisms and due diligence processes increasingly
reflect the extent to which corporations have become significant international actors. They better understand how corporate behavior affects social
goods and can threaten individual rights. As the accountability frameworks
have developed, as corporations gain legal status, failure to fully conceptualize both the nature of corporations and the extent of corporate operations
within conflict areas creates these recurring instances. Through these instances, the indelible consequences of corporate conduct, its broader effects,
continue to elude accountability for activities that implicate international
humanitarian law.

V. Conclusion
In 2007, the Association France Palestine Solidarité and the Palestine
Liberation Organization filed a lawsuit against Veolia and Alstom. The

347.
Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341.
348.
Id.; see also Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel’s
Violations of Palestinian Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www. hrw.org
/report/2016/01/19/occupation-inc/how-settlement-businesses-contribute-israels-violationspalestinian.
349.
See Who Profits, Touring Israeli Settlements: Business and Pleasure for The Economy of Occupation, 3–4 (Sept. 2017), https://whoprofits.org/flash-report/touring-israelisettlements-business-and-pleasure-for-the-economy-of-occupation/.
350.
See Government Resolution 1561: Special Assistance for the Year of 2016 to Judea
and Samaria, PRIME MINISTER’S OFF. (June 19, 2016), https://www.gov.il/he/Departments
/policies/2016_des1561, cited in Who Profits, supra note 349, at 3.
351.
Who Profits, supra note 349, at 3.
352.
Human Rights Council Report 2017, supra note 341, ¶ 24.
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plaintiffs argued that the French corporations violated international law
353
when they joined a consortium to develop a light rail project in Jerusalem.
The tram’s route ran through West Jerusalem but would (and now does) in354
clude a number of stops in the city’s Eastern sector. The route, the plaintiffs argued, permanently links the State of Israel with parts of the territory
355
that it had occupied since 1967. The Versailles Court of Appeal consid356
ered IHL’s application. It recounted the various legal mechanisms and cited the relevant articles and sub-paragraphs that apply to occupied territo357
ry. These were narrowly construed. They were held to apply solely to
358
states. Accordingly, the Court found that a French corporation could not
be held liable for the alleged infringement of international norms as these
359
impose obligations that are incumbent upon the occupying power alone.
360
Commentators queried the implications of the Court’s decision. The
case was read as a reversion to international law’s classic, state-centric,
formulation. It would limit the forms of international legal accountability
361
that can be extended to a corporation. The decision indeed underappreciates the progression of developments that have, since Nuremberg, extended
international legal liability to corporations. However, the line of critical reasoning that followed from the decision portrays too narrow a conception of

353.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, French Court: Jerusalem Rail Does Not Violate International Law, HAARETZ (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.haaretz.com/french-court-jerusalemlight-rail-project-legal-1.5240009.
354.
See Amina Nolte & Haim Yacobi, Politics, Infrastructure and Representation: The
Case of Jerusalem’s Light Rail, 43 CITIES 28, 31 (2015).
355.
Id. at 30, 35.
356.
See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 3e ch., Mar. 22, 2013,
ILM 2013, 52, 1161, 1175–76 (Fr.).
357.
Id.
358.
Id. at 1176 (holding that “the international texts referred to are acts signed between
States. The obligations or prohibitions contained therein are addressed to States”).
359.
Id. at 1176, 1178 (supplementing its position the Court held that “The [legal] personality of transnational enterprises, however, is recognised only to a very limited extent.
Their international capacity is admitted purely in the context of specific treaties which are essentially of an economic nature, and with a view to providing to these enterprises protection,
within the context of their activities abroad, against the State with which they might find
themselves in dispute or in specific cases of environmental liability”).
360.
See Eugene Kontorovich, Guest Post: Landmark French Ruling on West Bank Construction and International Law, OPINIO JURIS, (May 1, 2013), https://opiniojuris.org/2013/05
/01/guest-post-landmark-french-ruling-on-west-bank-const
ruction-and-international-law/;
Milena Sterio, Guest Post: French Companies May Build in the West Bank – An Assessment
of the Versailles Court of Appeals Case, OPINIO JURIS, (May 8, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org
/2013/05/08/guest-post-french-companies-may-build-in-the-west-bank-an-assessment-of-theversailles-court-of-appeals-case/; Kevin Jon Heller, The Difference Between Art. 49(6) of GC
IV and Art. 8(2)(b)(viii) of the RS, OPINIO JURIS, (May 1, 2013), https://opiniojuris.org/2013
/05/01/the-difference-between-art-496-of-gc-iv-and-art-82bviii-of-the-rs/.
361.
Mary Martin, Missing the Train: International Governance Gaps and the Jerusalem Light Railway, 4 GLOBAL AFF. 101, 103 (2018).
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accountability. The symbiotic relationship between international law, corporations, and accountability advances when law’s scope, purposes, and
sources are understood broadly. It is only then that the range of corporate
activities that impact norms enshrined in IHL in evolving and underexplored
ways can be fully conceptualized.
Rosalyn Higgins identifies two notions of accountability. The first usage describes the process of determining formal guilt (i.e., demonstrating
that an individual has the intention to perform an implicated act and/or the
362
requisite mental capacity). The second usage is preferable for current purposes. Higgins explains that a broader notion of accountability implies that
there is liability for internationally wrongful behavior and that that liability
363
must be discharged. Understanding accountability in its broadest sense—
as involving the justification of an actor’s conduct, assessing that conduct
against predetermined standards, and imposing consequences when the actor fails to meet those standards—allows for assessments of legal frameworks that are mindful of more than generalizable implementation and
364
compliance challenges.
The case studies described in section IV of this article instead tell of
particularities. They describe instances in which the absence of accountability results from the misalignment between primary legal rules, the recognized forms of implementation, and the nature of both corporations and their
undertaken business activities. The case of Blackwater illustrates how a direct violation by a corporation poses different accountability challenges that
are exclusive to a corporation and that differ from those that are generally
attributed to the non-compliant state. The case of Facebook demonstrates
how emerging industries pose novel challenges that implicate IHL in previously unforeseen ways. And the case of Airbnb evidences corporate conduct
that bears specific implications for IHL, for its normative purpose, that often
go unconsidered when assessed through the prominent legal frameworks
imposed to ensure accountability.
Corporations continue to gain international legal status. Regulatory regimes are further developing. To fully realize the prevalence and nature of
accountability gaps that remain undertreated through the application of the
prominent legal frameworks, it is necessary to look beyond those instances
when implementation fails or when narrow readings of law exclude particular actors. Better regulation necessitates broader conceptualization. We ask:
Who is accountable? To whom are they accountable? And what are the
365
standards against which accountability is assessed and implemented?
362.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW IT
WORKS 147 (1994).
363.
Id.
364.
See Jutta Brunnée, International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law
of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 4 (2005).
365.
See André Nollkaemper, Jan Wouters & Nicolas Hachez, Accountability and the
Rule of Law at International Level 5–6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Univer-
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In asking these questions we correctly assume that the norms prescribed
within international humanitarian law remain vulnerable to various forms of
corporate conduct. But responses to these challenges and efforts to engage
with such questions of accountability must more fully reflect the particularities of the corporate form. They must more accurately account for the evolving nature of business conduct within conflict zones. The International
Court of Justice, in the Reparations Advisory Opinion, pronounced that “the
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs
366
of the community.” If international law is to contribute to the process of
narrowing accountability gaps, if it is to provide an agreeable and accurate
vocabulary for determining standards and adjudging conduct, then regulatory efforts must begin by embracing those features that differentiate the corporation from those other entities that have traditionally held international
law’s attention.

sity of Amsterdam: Amsterdam Centre for International Law) (https://www.mzes.unimannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/reports/report%20Accountability%20and%20
Rule%20of%20Law.pdf).
366.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 178 184 (Apr. 11, 1949).

